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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Section 
Three, Article Eight of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Annotated 
78-2-2(3)(a). 
The Claimant, William R. Comer, applied for and was denied unemployment 
compensation following the termination of his employment by the employer 
Petitioner, The United States Air Force, His claim was then heard by an 
Administrative Law Judge who reversed the Department's prior determination. 
The employer appealed to the Board of Review who sustained the Administrative 
Law Judge. The employer filed a petition for review. 
The ruling of the Administrative Law Judge and the decision of the Board 
of Review have been reproduced as attachments A and B respectively and are 
included in the back of this brief. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was the decision of the Board of Review contrary to the facts in 
the record? 
2. Were the regulations which were applied reasonable and did they 
subserve the statute they were created to enforce? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
This case turns on the following law, reproduced as attachments, and 
included in the back of this brief. 
Attachment C: Executive Order 12584 
Attachment D: Utah Code Annotated 35-4-5 
Attachment E: Industrial Commission Rules 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. William R. Comer's employment with the United States Air Force was 
terminated on September 5, 1988, see record at 40. He applied for 
unemployment insurance benefits which were denied in a decision dated October 
3rd, 1988, see record at 38. A hearing was held on his appeal on October 
31st and November 1st, 1988, see record at 35. The administrative law judge 
reversed the prior determination and awarded Mr. Comer benefits in an order 
dated November 2, 1988. That decision was upheld by the Board of Review in 
its decision dated January 17, 1989. 
Mr. Comer was a boiler mechanic, wage grade 10 see record at 53, 79. 
Because of the area in which he was employed he was required to have a 
security clearance, see record at 55. 
Mr. Comer was terminated after the Air Force was notified that he had 
sold cocaine to an undercover agent and he was arrested, while on duty on Air 
Force property, after the conclusion of an undercover into allegations of his 
involvement in drug sales and use on base, see record at 43, 57, 80. The Air 
Force had previously been made aware, on August 16, 1988, that Mr. Comer was 
the subject of a drug investigation based on events which took place on Air 
Force property, see record at 43. The investigation involved a Mr. 
Stuffelbeam, an Air Force employee, who advised Air Force authorities that 
Mr. Comer had encouraged him "to participate in some illegal drug use", see 
record at 44, 63, 73. Mr. Stufflebeam further stated that he had observed 
drugs in Mr. Comer's possession while at work, see record at 73. Air Force 
authorities were advised by Mr. Stuffelbeam that Mr. Comer had invited him, 
while on the job, to use cocaine, see record at 64. Another Air Force 
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The Board of Review's decision is not supported by the record. 
By his actions in selling cocaine Mr. Comer lost required certification. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
TWO STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLY 
A 
FACTUAL DETERMINATIONS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE 
As with reviews of other administrative agencies this court gives 
deference to facts determined by the agency at the hearing level if they are 
supported by the evidence. Where they are not supported no such difference 
is given. In Hurst v. Board of Review of the Ind. Com'n, 723 P2d 416, 419 
(Utah, 1986) the Utah Supreme Court described this deference. "On questions 
of fact, the Commission's findings are conclusive and not subject to review 
by this Court unless they are without substantial support in the record and 
thus clearly arbitrary and capricious." Several "facts" contained in the 
decision of the Board of Review are without such support. 
At page 123 of the record the board concludes that "The incident had 
occurred away from the Air Force base during off-duty hours and did not 
involve other Air Force employees." The record of the hearing in fact shows 
that Mr, Comer was arrested on Air Force property during duty hours, record 
at page 78. It is also uncontroverted that the investigation initiated on 
Mr. Comer was commenced because of evidence of on base drug involvement, 
record at 78. The record also shows that one of the people to whom Mr. Comer 
sold drugs was a federal co-worker, record at 80. The record shows no denial 
by Mr. Comer of his admissions in the OSI report that he used cocaine and 
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Review are in error and do not follow from the evidence presented at the 
hearing. 
The Board held, at pages 123 and 124 of the record, 1. There was no 
showing that the claimants actions had a connection with the employees duties 
or the employer's business interests, and 2. Mr. Comer's termination was not 
for just cause. The employer was not represented by an attorney at the 
hearing. The employer did articulate numerous reasons, all supported by 
adequate evidence which would require the denial of benefits. That the Board 
of Review chose to focus its decision on the nexus and just cause issues 
should not bind the employer to those legal theories where evidence was 
presented which would require denial of benefits on other theories. 
The legal conclusions listed above are in error when viewed in light of 
the evidence presented at the hearing and should result in reversal of the 
board's decision. 
II 
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR JUST CAUSE 
Rule R475-5bl-2 defines just cause as having three elements a. 
culpability, b. knowledge, and c. control. 
A. CULPABILITY 
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(a) establishes general criteria for culpability. 
"The wrongness of the conduct must be considered in the context of the 
particular employment and how it affects the employer's rights." In 
analyzing culpability we must remember who the parties are. The employer is 
the United States Government, the employee is a mechanic whose employment 
required a security clearance. 
6 
The rights of the employer, pertaining to drug offenses, are broader 
than those of any other conceivable employer. This is the employer who, 
during the month Mr. Comer's appeal was heard, passed the National Narcotics 
Leadership Act of 1988, Public Law 100-690, filling 364 pages. The United 
States Government has waged war on drugs on many different fronts. One of 
the major problem areas addressed has been drugs in the military. The record 
shows that Mr. Comer was admonished by the commander of the organization 
employing him that drug involvement would-not be,tolerated. Those warnings, 
coupled with the United States Government's major offensive on drugs 
constitute major employer rights. 
Attached hereto as Attachment C is a copy of Executive Order 12584, 
issued by the President of the United States on September 15, 1986 entitled 
"Drug Free Federal Workplace. That Executive Order establishes national 
policy for all federal employees, Mr. Comer included. The Executive Order 
establishes national policy by ordering certain actions by federal employees 
and federal employers. 
In the findings section of the Executive Order the President finds that 
illegal drugs, on or off duty, 1. are inconsistent with the public trust 
placed in federal employees, 2. lessen effectiveness of those employees 
involved, 3. impairs the efficiency of government employers, and 4. is 
inconsistent with access to sensitive information. Mr. Comer was required to 
have a security clearance and was arguably in the category of people defined 
by the Executive Order to be in sensitive positions. 
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The Executive Order directs federal employers, Mr. Comer's included, to 
initiate action to remove offending employees. The employers are authorized 
to proceed on the basis of any appropriate evidence, conviction is not 
required. The offending employees retained their industrial due process 
rights under the Civil Service Reform Act. The Air Force's actions against 
Mr. Comer were required by and comported with Executive Order 12584. 
The Executive Order also issues specific directions to federal 
employees. They are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs (and 
by logical extension the sale of those drugs). The Executive Order refers 
only to the use of drugs, not to the consumption of drugs. It follows that 
anyone who sells drugs has used them even if they are in that rare category 
of drug dealers who have not consumed them. 
It takes little imagination to envision the public outcry which would 
arise if this federal employer failed to terminate the employment of drug 
peddlers on it's payroll. 
This case should be compared to that of Clearfield City v. Dept. of 
Employment S e c 663 P2d 440 (Utah 1983). There an off duty police officer 
was denied benefits after having been charged with sodomy. The court ruled 
that special status of the employer held the employee to a higher standard 
than might be required of other employees. (The policeman was ultimately 
acquitted or the sodomy charge). In citing another case of an employee of 
the federal government the Utah Supreme Court said, at 443, ". . . a public 
or private employer has the right to expect his employees to refrain from 
acts which would bring dishonor on the business name or the institution." 
The court also cited another public employment case denying benefits ". . . 
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the claimant had deliberately disregarded a statute which his employer had 
the affirmative duty to administer and enforce." Public Law 100-690 places 
such a responsibility upon the United States Department of Defense and 
accordingly upon the Air Force. 
The ruling of the Board of Review would require the Air Force to continue 
to employ Mr. Comer and those of his ilk until it could establish that they 
used them while working on supersonic jet aircraft, or be punished for 
terminating them. 
B. KNOWLEDGE 
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(b) discusses the knowledge element of just cause. 
The uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Comer, and his coworkers were told by 
their employer that no drug involvement would be tolerated. Mr. Comer had 
knowledge that he would be subject to discipline for selling drugs. 
C. CONTROL 
Rule R475-5bl-2(l)(c) discusses the control element of just cause. The 
issue is whether or not the employee had the ability to prevent the acts 
which led to his termination. No one but Mr. Comer controlled of whether or 
not he sold cocaine. 
All of the elements for a just cause discharge under Rule R475-5bl-2 
were met in Mr. Comer's termination. His just cause termination does not 
entitle him to unemployment benefits. The regulation requires that just 
cause be examined in light of the particular employment involved. This 
particular employment is more sensitive to drug involvement than almost any 
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conceivable. Any showing of culpability is sufficient to meet the just 
cause. 
Ill 
THE CLAIMANT WAS TERMINATED FOR WILLFUL AND 
WANTON ACTS ADVERSE TO HIS EMPLOYER 
The Appellant firmly believes that the actions of the claimant fit 
within the parameters of both the statute and the regulation pertaining to 
acts constituting a crime with an employment nexus shown. If the court 
reaches the conclusion that Mr. Comer's acts do not constitute a crime it 
must nonetheless deny benefits because the Claimant's acts were willful and 
wanton and adverse to the employer's rightful interest, as that term is used 
at U.C.A. 35-4-5(b)(l). 
Ill 
THE RULE UNDER WHICH THE CLAIMANT WAS GRANTED 
BENEFITS DOES NOT REASONABLY RELATE TO THE PURPOSE 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT 
A 
THE RULE DOESN'T SUPPORT THE ACT 
While this court must give deference to the Industrial Commission's 
rules and there interpretation that deference does not apply if the rule is 
not reasonable. In West Jordan v. Department of Employment Sec, 656 P.2d 
411, 412 (Utah, 1982) the Utah Supreme Court said "... agency decisions are 
still subject to judicial review and will be reversed where they are 
inconsistent with the governing legislation or the decision so this Court." 
The stated purpose of the Employment Security Act is to benefit the ". . 
health, morals, and welfare of the people of this state", U.C.A. 35-4-2. 
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The description of that purpose was amplified by the Industrial Commission in 
rule R475-2-l(l) "One of the purposes of the Employment Security Act is the 
lighten the burdens of persons unemployed through no fault of their own..." 
The "through no fault of his own" language of the rule was apparently taken 
directly from the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Olof Nelson Const. Co. v. 
Industrial Commission, 121 Utah 525, 243 P.2d 951, 958 (1952). The "through 
no fault of his own" language in the both the rule and the Olof Nelson case 
state the purpose of the act. The clear, uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. 
Comer claimant was in complete control of his actions and chose to sell 
drugs. His discharge and resulting unemployment was not "through no fault of 
his own". He had a secure job with the most complete set of industrial due 
process rights existing any where in the world yet chose to deliberately 
flout his employers clearly stated policy against any drug involvement. The 
health, morals and welfare of the people of this state are not uplifted in 
any fashion by requiring the federal government to employ drug dealers. 
The application of the departments rules in a fashion which allows Mr. 
Comer to receive benefits is contrary to the stated intent of the statute and 
the Supreme Court's prior decisions interpreting it. 
B 
THE RULES ARE RANDOMLY APPLIED 
Attached hereto as Attachment F is a copy of the Board of Review 
decision in Johnson v. Industrial Commission, Case number 880703-CA. In that 
case the Board of Review upheld the Administrative Law Judge's decision not 
to allow benefits where an employee violated his employers drug and alcohol 
policy through off base use. 
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The employer's drug and alcohol policy could not be any more strict in 
Johnson than in this case yet the Board of Review failed to take The Air 
Force's policy into account. In Johnson the Board of Review relied upon the 
claimant's violation of state drug laws, including U.C.A. 58-37-8, but 
refused to give an identical argument any weight here. This is despite the 
claimant's specific admission to the sale of cocaine at the time he applied 
for benefits, see record at 2. 
The fact that Mr. Comer was discovered to have been involved with drugs 
through and undercover buy from him does not lessen the application of the 
legislative finding, stated at U.C.A. 34-38-1, that a drug free work force 
is a laudable goal. The Board of Review's sustaining the employer in it's 
attempts to achieve this goal in Johnson only makes its failure to do so in 
this case that much more mystifying. 
While the appellant is not arguing that the Johnson case is precedent in 
this case the Board of Review's application of different rules to similar 
circumstances can only lead to the conclusion that the rules are not 
reasonable and rationally applied as required by the Supreme Court in the 
West Jordan case. 
IV 
THE RULE UNDER WHICH THE CLAIMANT WAS GRANTED 
BENEFITS DOES NOT REASONABLY RELATE TO THE PURPOSE 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT REGULATIONS 
Industrial Commission Rule R475-2-l(l) was cited in the next proceeding 
section as stating the legislative intent of the Act. As the preamble, that 
rule also states the intent of the rest of the unemployment compensation 
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regulations. That intent is to provide relief for persons unemployed 
"through no fault of their own". For the reasons stated in section A of the 
next preceding section of this brief Mr. Comer's actions should deny him 
benefits because his loss of employment was through his own fault. 
VI 
THE FACTS IN THE RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT THE BOARD'S RESULT 
The Board of Review was required to rely upon the facts within the 
record. The Administrative Law Judge and the Board of Review both ignored 
uncontroverted evidence which require denial of benefits. That evidence 
includes 
(a) The claimant's admission of distribution of cocaine, record at 2, 
3, and 80 showing dishonesty, actions constituting a crime, and violation of 
his employer's stated policy on drugs. 
(b) The claimant's industrial due process rights before the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, see record at 42, showing that his discharge was 
for just cause, 
(c) The individual to whom he sold cocaine was a co-worker, record at 
80 showing work involvement, 
(d) The claimant's understanding of the employer's explicit no drug 
policy, see record at 52, 87 showing culpability and just cause for 
dismissal. 
(e) The Air Force has a strong anti-drug policy, see record at 12, 50, 
68, 74, and 113, showing that off base drug sales are work related. 
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VII 
THE CLAIMANT WAS DISCHARGED FOR DISHONESTY 
CONSTITUTING A CRIME 
U.C.A. 35-4-5(b)(2) denies the claimant benefits if he was discharged 
for dishonesty constituting a crime. Commission Rule R475-5b2 elaborates. 
"A crime is a punishable act in violation of law: an offense against the 
State or the United States", R475-5b2(l). R475-5b2(3) lists the elements as 
a. in connection with work, b. dishonesty, and c. admitted or established by 
a conviction in a court of law. 
As shown above in the discussion on "Just Cause" the claimant's actions 
in selling cocaine were in connection with work. This follows from the fact 
that his employer is charged by the United States Congress with eradicating 
drug abuse, the fact that he, and his fellow employees, had been advised that 
any drug involvement would result in termination. 
Neither the Act nor its regulations define dishonesty. It is therefore 
appropriate to examine other common legal definitions of the term. Black's 
Law Dictionary does not define honest or honesty. It does define dishonesty 
as "Disposition to lie, cheat or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of 
integrity." The first synonym for honest listed by The Random House 
Thesaurus, College Edition, is "law abiding". The act of selling cocaine is 
chargeable as a second degree felony under U.C.A. 58-37-8. It is also a 
crime chargeable under 21 U.S.C. 841. The latter statute being enacted by 
the United States of America, the employer of Mr. Butler. The natural, 
logical definitions of dishonesty include the claimant's actions. 
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The only issue remaining is whether his actions were admitted or 
established by a conviction in a court of law. The record shows Mr. Comer's 
acknowledgment of his crime as well as the fact that he had plead guilty to a 
drug related offense. The board acknowledged that his actions constituted a 
crime, record at 124. 
The actions of Mr. Comer meet the statutory definition of dishonesty 
constituting a crime and should result in denial of benefits. 
VIII 
THE CLAIMANT LOST HIS LICENSE 
Rule 475-5b-8(5) includes among appropriate reasons for discharge "When 
an employee loses a license which he knows is required for the performance of 
the job, and the individual had control over the circumstances which resulted 
in the loss of the license, such conduct is disqualifying." 
As a mechanic Mr. Comer was required to have a current restricted area 
clearance. The uncontroverted evidence is that the Air Force Security 
Clearance Office suspends the security clearances of drug offenders, see 
record at 66. The Security Clearance Office is not under the control of Air 
Force Officials at Hill Air Force Base and that office's independent action 
constitutes a lose of license under the rule. 
The respondent may argue that suspending Mr. Comer's security clearance 
is an act over which the employer had control and may not be used as an 
independent ground for termination. The logical extension of that argument 
is that the State of Utah will never be justified in terminating a driver 
under this regulation because the Department of Motor Vehicles is an agency 
of the state. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
The Board of Review in this action completely ignored relevant law, 
facts in the record, and commonly used definitions of words in order to award 
Mr. Comer unemployment benefits. Mr. Comer admitted selling cocaine. That 
sale constituted adequate grounds to allow any employer to terminate an 
employee for cause and to deny benefits. 
In this case other special facts make the Board of Review's decision 
even more inappropriate. First, Mr. Comer had substantial industrial due 
process rights. Had he truly felt he was being unjustly terminated he could 
have followed that process, while remaining on the payroll. Second, Mr. 
Comer, and his fellow federal employees, are held to a higher standard 
because of the special status of their employer. Mr. Comer was informed of 
this by his commander. All federal employees are presumed to have notice of 
this by virtue of Executive Order 12584. 
Mr. Comer's termination, without benefits, was appropriate under the 
majority of operative provisions of the Departments Regulations. The denial 
of benefits is clearly supported by the evidence while the granting of 
benefits is not. The decision of the Board of Review should be reversed and 
benefits denied. 
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Dated this 30th day of May, 1989 
DEE V. BENSON 
United States Attorney 
by 
)BERT H.WILDE 
Special Assistant 
United^Startes Attorney 
CLARE A. J(j 
Special Assistant 
United States Attorney 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Appeals Tribunal 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge 
William R. Comer 
4364 Palmer Road 
Erda, Utah 84074 
APPEAL FILED: October 12, 1988 
S.S.A. No. 528-08-6111 
Case No. 88-A-04707 
DATE OF HEARING: October 31, 1988 
November 1, 1988 
APPEARANCES: Claimant/Employer 
David Knowlton, Esq. 
PLACE OF HEARING: Telephone 
The Department's decision dated October 3, 1988, denied unemployment insurance 
benefits effective September 4, 1988, holding the claimant was discharged from 
his employment for just cause. Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah Employment 
Security Act is quoted on the attached sheet. 
Jurisdiction for this review is established in accordance with Section 
35-4-6(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Rules pertaining thereto. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The claimant worked as a boiler plant equipment mechanic for Hill Air Force 
Base from December 1, 1980 to August 16, 1988. He was terminated from his 
employment because of off-duty conduct which resulted in him being placed under 
arrest. 
The claimant worked for the employer at the Utah Test and Training Range. The 
position required a security clearance. The employer had provided him with a 
limited access badge to the controlled area pending adjudication of his 
security clearance. 
Sometime in February 1988, one of the claimant's co-workers approached the 
personnel department to discuss his employment status. He represented that he 
was a recovering drug user and finding it difficult to function in his current 
work assignment. He suggested that the claimant had invited him to use a 
controlled substance on the job. As a result of the conversation, the 
co-worker was transferred to a position at Hill Air Force Base. The matter was 
referred to the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. The latter part of 
February, 1988, the employer took away the claimant's limited access badge. He 
was required at that point to be escorted into controlled areas. The 
claimant's manager attempted to have him transferred to a new work station 
which would not require a security clearance. 
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On July 26, 1988, a criminal complaint was issued against the claimant for 
unlawful distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance. The complaint alleged that a party had 
purchased cocaine from the claimant on April 8, 1988. The claimant was 
arrested while at work on August 16, 1988, and charged with unlawful 
distribution of a controlled substance. He served one day in jail and was then 
released on bail. He reported back to work the following day. He was barred 
from re-entering the military installation pending an investigation of the 
incident. 
A Notice of Proposed Removal Letter was presented to the claimant on August 21, 
1988. He was advised the action was proposed for the offense of off-duty 
misconduct of such a major import that the employee was unable to fulfill his 
job responsibilities. The letter suggested the claimant had sold two grams of 
cocaine, a controlled substance, to a Utah State Narcotics Bureau special agent 
on April 8, 1988. A Report of Investigation was distributed to the employer on 
August 30, 1988, detailing the events that led to the claimant's arrest on 
August 16, 1988. A decision was issued by the employer on September 1, 1988, 
removing the claimant from his civil service position. 
The claimant had received no previous warnings concerning his job performance. 
He was considered by the employer to be a satisfactory employee. The claimant 
appeared in court on September 19, 1988, and entered a guilty plea' to a 
third-degree felony charge of attempting to unlawfully distribute a controlled 
substance. He is scheduled to be sentenced the first part of November, 1988. 
REASONING AND CONCLUSION OF LAW: 
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) provide in 
pertinent part: 
A. . Unemployment insurance benefits will be denied if 
the employer had just cause for discharging the employee. 
However, not every cause for discharge provides a basis to deny 
benefits. In order to have just cause for discharge pursuant 
to Section 35-4-5(b)(l), there must be some fault on the part 
of the employee involved. 
B. JUST CAUSE 
1. The basic factors which establish just cause and are 
essential for a determination of ineligibility are: 
a. Culpability 
This is the seriousness of the conduct or the severity of the 
offense as it affects continuance of the employment 
relationship. The discharge must have been necessary to avoid 
actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful interests. 
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B.l.b Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the conduct which the 
employer expected. It is not necessary that the claimant 
intended to cause harm to the employer, but he should 
reasonably have been able to anticipate the effect his conduct 
would have. 
B.l.c Control 
The conduct must have been within the power and capacity of the 
claimant to control or prevent. 
G. IN CONNECTION WITH EMPLOYMENT 
Disqualifying conduct is not limited to offenses which take 
place on the employer's premises or during business hours. It 
is only necessary that the conduct have such "connection" to 
the employee's duties and to the employer's business that it is 
a subject of legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer. All employers, both public and private, have the 
right to expect employees to refrain from acts which are 
detrimental to the business or would bring dishonor on the 
business name or the institution. Legitimate interests of 
employers include, but are not limited to: Goodwill of 
customer, reputation of the business, efficiency, business 
costs, morale of employees, discipline, honesty, trust and 
loyalty. 
The claimant, at the time of separation, was a suspect in a case involving the 
distribution of a controlled substance. Although he had been implicated in the 
sale, he had entered no plea on the charge nor had he provided any statements 
to the employer representing guilt on his part. The employer relied solely on 
the investigation report which alleged the claimant had been involved in the 
sale of a controlled substance. It is of special note that the offense 
occurred while the claimant was off duty. There was no special notoriety given 
to the incident other than the claimant being arrested while at work on August 
16, 1988. The matter was not publicized and co-workers who may have observed 
the arrest could only speculate as to the cause of that action. The claimant 
emphatically denies using drugs on the job or participating in any activities 
which would have resulted in co-workers purchasing or using illegal substances. 
The employer's position that the discharge was prompted by the claimant's 
inability to obtain a security clearance is unpersuasive. The claimant had 
worked for the employer for over seven years without any special clearance, and 
the evidence does not sustain that this hampered his job performance in any 
way. The only supportable conclusion to be adduced from the evidence presented 
by the parties is that the claimant was discharged for his off-duty conduct 
which resulted in his being arrested on August 11, 1988. The employer failed 
to show the conduct had any direct connection to the employee's duties, or the 
employer's legitimate business interest. While the employer may have had the 
right to fire the claimant because of his off-duty activities, there is 
insufficient evidence to show his actions rise to the level of culpability so 
as to constitute disqualifying~conduct under the terms of the statute. Under 
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these circumstances, the Administrative Law Judge concludes the claimant was 
not discharged from his employment for just cause. 
DECISION: 
The Department's decision denying to pay the claimant unemployment insurance 
benefits pursuant to the provisions of Section 35-4-5(b)(l) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act is reversed. The claimant is allowed unemployment 
insurance benefits effective September 4, 1988, provided he is otherwise 
eligible. 
^Z-4c=^ 
Norman Barnes 
Administrative Law Judge 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
This decision will become final unless, within ten days from November 2, 1988, 
further written appeal is made to the Board of Review (P.O. Box 11600, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84147) setting forth the grounds upon which the appeal is made. 
mj 
Attachment 
cc: Air Force Hill Air Force Base 
2849 ABG/DPCEB 
Civilian Personnel, D. Mabey 
Hill AFB, Utah 84056 
David Knowlton, Esq. 
BOARD OF REVIEW TRC/NB/AH/cdm 
The Indust r ia l Commission of Utah 
Unemployment Compensation Appeals 
WILLIAM R. COMER 
S.S.A. No. 528-08-6111 : 
Case No. 88-A-4707 
: DECISION 
: Case No. 88-BR-435 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
The employer, U. S. Air Force-Hil l A i r Force Base, appeals the 
decision of the Administrat ive Law Judge, in the above-enti t led matter 
which held that WiTliam R. Comer had been discharged from his employment 
for reasons that are not d isqual i fy ing under §35-4-5(5)(1) of the Utah 
Employment Security Act. The ALJ's decision therefore allowed payment of 
unemployment benefi ts to the claimant ef fect ive September 4, .1988 and 
cont inuing, provided he is otherwise e l i g i b l e . 
After careful consideration of the record in t h i s matter, the 
Board of Review finds the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to be 
a correct appl icat ion of the provisions of the Utah Employment Security 
Act, supported by competent evidence, and therefore aff irms the decision. 
Comer was f i r e d by the Ai r Force af ter he was arrested by c i v i -
l i an author i t ies and charged with d is t r ibu t ion of i l l e g a l drugs. Comer 
la te r pled gu i l t y to a reduced charge of attempted d i s t r i bu t i on of 
i l l e g a l drugs. The incident had occurred away from the A i r Force base 
during of f -duty hours and did not involve other A i r Force employees. 
Seven months p r i o r to Comer's ar rest , a co-worker advised the 
Base Commander that Comer had offered him i l l ega l drugs while on duty. 
Comer was not t o l d of the co-worker's al legations nor was any d isc ip-
l inary act ion taken against him. At the hearing before the ALJ, the 
employer did not ca l l the co-worker as a witness; Comer t e s t i f i e d under 
oath that the co-worker's al legations were fa lse . 
In permit t ing payment of benefi ts, the Board does not minimize 
Comer's reprehensible conduct. However, benefits cannot be denied under 
§5(b) (1) unless i t is shown that his misconduct was " i n connection with 
employment" and that such misconduct constituted " jus t cause" for his 
discharge. 
The Board recognizes that even off-duty conduct may be " in con-
nection with employment" under some circumstances. As stated in Unemploy-
ment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-7: 
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Disqual i fy ing conduct is not l im i ted to offenses 
which take place on the employer's premises or 
during business hours. I t is only necessary that 
the conduct have such "connection11 to the employee's 
duties and to the employer's business that i t is a 
subject of legi t imate and s ign i f i can t concern to the 
employer. 
In th i s case, the employer has fa i led to establ ish any such connection 
between Comer's cr iminal conduct and his work duties or the employer's 
business. The employer might have demonstrated such a connection by proving 
Comer offered i l l e g a l drugs to other employees at work, as alleged by a 
co-worker. However, the co-worker's al legations were submitted in the form 
of a hearsay statement by another witness; the employer f a i l ed to obtain the 
d i rect testimony of the co-worker himself. For his par t , Comer categorical ly 
denied, under oath, the co-worker's a l legat ions. Given th is state of the 
record, no competent evidence exists to support a f ind ing of employment-
related drug a c t i v i t y . The Board must therefore conclude that Comer's mis-
conduct was not in connection with employment. 
Even i f the Board were to f ind that Comer's misconduct was con-
nected to his employment, the employer must also establ ish that Comer's 
discharge was fo r j us t cause as that term is used in § 5 ( b ) ( l ) . Just cause is 
established i f each of the elements of c u l p a b i l i t y , knowledge and control 
ex i s t . I t is the element of cu lpab i l i t y which is absent in th is case. 
Cu lpab i l i t y is defined as the seriousness of the worker's conduct 
as i t a f fects continuance of the employment re la t ionsh ip . The discharge must 
have been necessary to avoid actual or potent ia l harm to the employer's 
r i g h t f u l i n t e r e s t s . (See Unemployment Insurance Rule R475-5bl-2.1.a) While 
the employer might conceivably be able to show Comer's conduct posed some 
potent ia l fo r harm to i t s legi t imate in te res ts , mere speculation and conclu-
sionary statements on the part of the employer are i nsu f f i c i en t to establish 
c u l p a b i l i t y . The Board pa r t i cu la r l y notes the employer permitted Comer to 
continue his employment even af ter serious charges of drug related ac t i v i t y 
had been leveled against him. The employer's f a i l u r e to act indicates i t 
did not consider Comer's p r io r conduct to be culpable. The Board must there-
fore conclude Comer was not discharged for j us t cause wi th in the meaning of 
§5(b) ( l ) of the Act . 
This decision becomes f ina l on the date i t is mailed, and any 
fu r ther appeal must be made wi th in 30 days from the date of mai l ing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in wr i t ing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake C i t y , Utah. To f i l e an 
appeal wi th the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the 
Court a Pe t i t ion fo r Writ of Review set t ing fo r th the reasons for appeal, 
WILLIAM R. COMER 
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pursuant to §63-465-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act and 
Rule 14 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, followed by a Docketing 
Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9 and 24-27, Rules of 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
Dated this 17th day of January, 1989. 
Date Mailed: January 25, 1989. 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the following on t h i s , £ $ -
day of January, 1989 by mailing the same, postage prepaid, United States 
mail to: 
Ms. Clare A. Jones 
Attorney-Advisor 
Office of the Staff Judge Advocate 
Hill Air Force Base, Utah 84056-5990 
Ai r Force-Hi l l A i r Force Base 
2849 ABG/DPCEB 
Civilian Personnel, D. Mabey 
Hill AFB, Utah 34056 
David J . Knowlton 
Attorney at Law 
2910 Washington, Suite 305 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
William R. Comer 
4364 Palmer Road 
Erda, Utah 84074 
-yd^ 
/-v /ABOARD 
& uUr^jArh 
m&&s* 
^ r 
v^s^ 
mmd a*** Presidential Documents 
VdL 51, No. ISO 
Wtdattdsy, Stpcsmbtt 17, lfse 
Title 9— Executive Order 125*4 of September 15f 1986 
The President Drug-Free Federal Workplace 
I RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that: 
Drug use is having serious adverse effects upon a significant proportion of the 
national work force and results in billions of dollars of lost productivity each 
yean 
The Federal government as an employer, is concerned with the well-being of 
its employees, the successful accomplishment of agency missions, and the 
need to maintain employee productivity; 
The Federal government, as the largest employer in the Nation, can and 
should show the wjy towards achieving drug-free workplaces through a 
program designed to offer drug users a helping hand and at the same time. 
demonstrating to drug users and potential drug users that drugs will not be 
tolerated in the Federal workplace; 
The profits from illegal drugs provide the single greatest source of income for 
organized crime, fuel violent street crime, and otherwise contribute to the 
breakdown of our society, 
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees is inconsistent 
not only with the law-abiding behavior expected of all citizens, but also with 
the special trust placed in such employees as servants of the public; 
Federal employees who use illegal drugs, on or off duty, tend to be less 
productive, less reliable, and prone to greater absenteeism than their fellow 
employees who do not use illegal drugs; 
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees .impairs the 
efficiency of Federal departments and agencies, undermines public confidence 
in them, and makes it more difficult for other employees who do not use illegal 
drugs to perform their jobs effectively. The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, 
by Federal employees also can pose a serious health and safety threat to 
members of the public and to other Federal employees; 
The use of illegal drugs, on or off duty, by Federal employees in certain 
positions evidences less than the complete reliability, stability, and good 
judgment that is consistent with access to sensitive information and creates 
the possibility of coercion, influence, and irresponsible action under pressure 
that may pose a serious risk to national security, the public safety, and the 
effective enforcement of the law; and 
Federal employees who use illegal drugs must themselves be primarily respon-
sible for changing their behavior and if necessary, begin the process of 
rehabilitating themselves. 
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States of America, including section 3301(2) of Title 5 of the United 
States Code, section 7301 of Title 5 of the United States Code, section 290ee-l 
of Title 42 of the United States Code, deeming such action in the best interests 
of national security, public health and safety, law enforcement and the 
efficiency of the Federal service, and in order to establish standards and 
procedures to ensure fairness in achieving a drug-free Federal workplace and 
to protect the privacy of Federal employees, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
Section L Drug-Free Workplace. 
(a) Federal employees are required to refrain from the use of illegal drugs. 
Ateh 1 
(b) The use of illegal drugs by Federal employees, whether on duty or off duty, 
is contrary to the efficiency of the service. 
(c) Persons who use illegal drugs are not suitable for Federal employment 
Sec 2. Agency Responsibilities. 
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall develop a plan for achieving the 
objective of a drug-free workplace with due consideration of the rights of the 
government the employee, and the general public. 
(b) Each agency plan shall include: 
(1) A statement of policy setting forth the agency's expectations regarding 
drug use and the action to be anticipated in response to identified drug use: 
(2) Employee Assistance Programs emphasizing high level direction, educa-
tion, counseling, referral to rehabilitation, and coordination with available 
community resources; 
(3) Supervisory training to assist in identifying and addressing illegal drug use 
by agency employees; 
i4) Provision for self-referrals as well as supervisory referrals to treatment 
with maximum respect for individual confidentiality consistent with safety 
and security issues; and 
(5) Provision for identifying illegal drug users, including testing on a controlled 
and carefully monitored basis in accordance with this Order. 
Sec 3. Drug Testing Programs. 
(a) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program to test for the 
use of illegal drugs by employees in sensitive positions. The extent to which 
such employees are tested and the criteria for such testing shall be determined 
by the head of each agency, based upon the nature of the agency's mission 
and its employees' duties, the efficient use of agency resources, and the 
danger to the public health and safety or national security that could result 
from the failure of an employee adequately to discharge his or her position. 
(b) The head of each Executive agency shall establish a program for voluntary 
employee drug testing. 
(c) In addition to the testing authorized in subsections (a) and (b) of this 
section, the head of each Executive agency is authorized to test an employee 
for illegal drug use under the following circumstances: 
(1) When there is a reasonable suspicion tot any employee uses illegal drugs; 
(2) In an examination authorized by the agency regarding an accident or. 
unsafe practice; or 
(3) As part of or as a follow-up to counseling or rehabilitation for illegal drug 
use through an Employee Assistance Program. 
(d) The head of each Executive agency is authorized to test any applicant for 
illegal drug use. 
Sec 4. Drug Testing Procedures. 
(a) Sixty days prior to the implementation of a drug testing program pursuant 
to this Order, agencies shall notify employees that testing for use of illegal 
drugs is to be conducted and that they may seek counseling and rehabilitation 
and inform them of the procedures for obtaining such assistance through the 
agency's Employee Assistance Program. Agency drug testing programs al-
ready ongoing are exempted from the 60-day notice requirement Agencies 
may take action under section 3(c) of this Order without reference to the 60-
day notice period 
(b) Before conducting a drug test the agency shall inform the employee to be 
tested of the opportunity to submit medical documentation that may support a 
legitimate use for a specific drug. 
(c) Drug testing programs shall contain procedures for timely submission of 
requests for retention of records and specimens; procedures for retesting; and 
procedures, consistent with applicable law, to protect the confidentiality of 
test results and related medical and rehabilitation records. Procedures for 
providing urine specimens must allow individual privacy, unless the agency 
has reason to believe that a particular individual may alter or substitute the 
specimen to be provided 
(d) The Secretary of Health and Human Services Is authorized to promulgate 
scientific and technical guidelines for drug testing programs, and agencies 
shall conduct their drug testing programs in accordance with these guidelines 
once promulgated. 
Sac 5. Personnel Actions. 
(a} Agencies shall in addition to any appropriate personnel actions, refer any 
employee who is found to use illegal drugs to an Employee Assistance 
Program for assessment counseling, and referral for treatment or rehabilita-
tion as appropriate. 
(b) Agencies shall Initiate action to discipline any employee who is found to 
use illegal drags, provided that snch action is not required for an employee 
who: 
(1) Voluntarily identifies hiitf»ef as a user of illegal drugs or who volunteers 
for drug testing pursuant to section 3(b) of this Order, prior to being identified 
through other means; 
(2) Obtains counseling or xehabdxtatiaa through an Employee Assistance 
Program; and 
(3] Thereafter refrains from using illegal drugs. 
(c) Agencies shall not allow any employee to remain on duty in a sensitive 
position who is found to use illegal drugs, prior to successful completion of 
rehabilitation through an Employee Assistance Program. However, as part of a 
rehabilitation or counseling program, the head of an Executive agency may, in 
his or her discretion, allow an employee to return to duty in a sensitive 
position if it is determined that tins action would not pose a danger to public 
health or safety or the national security. 
(d) Agencies shall initiate action to remove from the service any employee 
who is found to use illegal drugs and: 
(1) Refuses to obtain counseling or rehabilitation through an Employee Assist-
ance Program; or 
(2) Does not thereafter refrain from using illegal drugs. 
(e) The results of a drug test and information developed by the agency in the 
course of the drug# testing of the employee may be considered in processing 
any adverse action against the employee or for other administrative purposes. 
Preliminary test results may not be used in an administrative proceeding 
unless they are confirmed by a second analysis of the same sample or unless 
the employee confirms the accuracy of tbe initial test by admitting the use of 
illegal drugs. 
(f) The determination of an agency that an employee uses illegal drugs can be 
made on the basis of any appropriate evidence, including direct observation, a 
criminal conviction, administrative inquiry, or the results of an authorized 
testing program. Positive drug test results may be rebutted by other evidence 
that an employee has not used illegal drugs. 
(g) Any action to discipline an employee who is using illegal drugs (including 
removal from the service, if appropriate) shall be taken in compliance with 
otherwise applicable procedures, including the Civil Service Reform Act. 
(h) Drug testing shall not be conducted pursuant to this Order for the purpose 
of gathering evidence for use in criminal proceedings. Agencies are not 
required to report to the Attorney General for investigation or prosecution any 
information, allegation* or evidence relating to violations of Title 21 of the 
United States Code received as a result of the operation of drug testing 
programs established pursuant to this Order. 
Sec 8. Coordination of Agency Programs. 
(a) The Director of the Office of Personnel Management shall: 
(1} Issue government-wide guidance to agencies on the implementation of the 
terms of this Order 
(2) Ensure that appropriate coverage for drug abuse is maintained for employ-
ees and their families under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program: 
(3) Develop a model Employee Assistance Program for Federal agencies and 
assist the agencies in putting programs in place; 
(4) In consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, develop 
and improve training programs for Federal supervisors and managers on 
illegal drug use: and 
(5) In cooperation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and 
heads of Executive agencies, mount an intensive drug awareness campaign 
throughout the Federal work force, 
(b) The Attorney General shall render legal advice regarding the implementa-
tion of this Order and shall be consulted with regard to all guidelines. 
regulations, and policies proposed to be adopted pursuant to this Order. 
(c) Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to limit the authorities of the 
Director of Central Intelligence under the National Security Act of 1947, as 
amended, or the statutory authorities of the National Security Agency or the 
Defense Intelligence Agency. Implementation of this Order within the Intelli-
gence Community, as defined in Executive Order No. 12333, shall be subject to 
the approval of the head of the affected agency. 
Sec 7. Definitions. 
(a) This Order applies to all agencies of the Executive Branch. 
(b) For purposes of this Order, the term "agency" means an_Executive agency, 
as defined in 5 U.S.C 105; the Uniformed Services, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 
2101(3) (but excluding the armed forces as defined by 5 U.S.C- 2101(2)); or any 
other employing unit or authority of the Federal government, except the 
United States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission* and employing 
units or authorities in the Judicial and Legislative Branches. 
(c) For purposes of this Order, the term "illegal drugs'* means a controlled 
substance included in Schedule I or II, as defined by section 802(6) of Title 21 
of the United States Code, the possession of which is unlawful under chapter 
'13 of that Title. The term "illegal drugs" does not mean the use of a controlled 
jubstance pursuant to a valid prescription or other uses authorized by law. 
(d) For purposes of this Order, the term "employee in a sensitive position" 
refers to: 
(1) An employee in a position that an agency head designates Special Sensi-
tive, Critical-Sensitive, or Noncritical-Sensitive under Chapter 731 of the 
Federal Personnel Manual or an employee in a position that an agency head 
designates as sensitive in accordance with Executive Order No. 10450. as 
amended; 
(2) An employee who has been granted access to classified information or 
may be granted access to classified information pursuant to a determination of 
trustworthiness by an agency head under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 
123S8; 
(3) Individuals serving under Presidential appointments: 
(4) Law enforcement officers as defined in 5 U.S.C 8331(20); and 
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(5) Other positions that the agency head determines involve law enforcement 
national security, the protection of life and property, public health or safety, or 
other functions requiring a high degree of trust and confidence. 
(e) For purposes of this Order, the term "employee'* means all persons 
appointed in the Civil Service as described in 5 U.S.C. 2105 (but excluding 
persons appointed in the armed services as defined in 5 tLS.G 2102(2]]. 
(f) For purposes of this Order, the term "Employee Assistant* Program** 
means agency-based counseling programs that offer assessment short-term 
counseling, and referral services to employees for a wide range of drug, 
alcohol, and mental health programs that affect employee job performance. 
Employee Assistance Programs are responsible for referring drug-using em-
ployees for rehabilitation and for monitoring employees' progress while in 
treatment 
SeK. a. Effective Date. This Order is effective immediately. 
THE WHITE HOUSE 
September 15, 1986. 
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Editorial note For the President's remarks of September 15 on signing £ 0 12264. tee the Weekly 
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R475-2-1 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION L™ ^M I NCCSE™ 
R475-21a. Combined Wage Claims 
R475-22. Definition of Terms in Employment Security Act 
R475-22J. Included Employment 
R475-22ra. Unemployment 
R475-22p Wages 
R475-35b. Extended Benefits 
R475-35f. Required Public Announcement 
R475-45 Wage Freeze Following Workmen's 
CompensaUon 
R475-2. Purpose of Employment 
Security Act 
R475-2-1. Preamble 
R475-2-2. Evidentiary Requirements 
R475-2-1. Preamble 
1 One of the purposes of the Employment Secu-
rity Act is to lighten the burdens of persons unemp-
loyed through no fault of their own by maintaining 
their purchasing power in the economy The legisla-
ture, in estabhsrung this program, recognized the 
substantial social ills associated with unemployment 
and sought to ameliorate these problems with a 
program to pay workers for a limited time while they 
seek other employment It is because of these reasons 
that it is in the public interest to liberally construe 
and administer the Act It is important that both the 
worker seeking benefits and the employer who will 
ultimately pay for such benefits understand the 
process by which contributions are assessed and 
benefits are paid The following Rules are written to 
explain and clarify the application of the Act In 
applying these Rules to individual cases the Depart-
ment will consider the reasonableness of claimant's 
action, the totality of the employment situation, and 
whether the claimant has a genuine continuing atta-
chment to the labor market 
2 The Utah Department of Employment Security 
has an obligation to be unbiased m administration of 
the Act Therefore, the Department must allow all 
parties due process betore dispensing the revenues 
provided by the Employment Security Act in order to 
protect the investment of employers who contributed 
to the unemployment insurance fund, the interests of 
the unemployed workers who may be eligible for the 
dollars provided by the fund, and the community 
which benefits from a stable workforce through the 
maintenance of purchasing power Due process req-
uires that employers will not be charged contribut-
ions for benefits, and workers will not be denied 
benefits, without the opportunity to provide infor-
mation and contest or refute the information consi-
dered m the decision making process 
3 When an eligible worker has jio work available 
there exists no controversy between the worker, the 
employer, or the Department and benefits must be 
paid promptly if all the provisions of Act are met. 
However, when a worker quits, is fired, or has any 
other issue under the law an investigation of the cir-
cumstances must take place to determine if benefits 
can be paid In determining whether or not the 
worker is eligible for benefits, his actions arc meas-
ured against the standards of just cause following a 
discharge, and good cause and equity and good 
conscience following a voluntary separation from 
employment When one party fails to provide infor-
mation or when that information is less credible, the 
result is that the party who has the responsibdity to 
provide information may not prevail in its position. 
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R475-2-2. Evidentiary Requirements 
The evidentiary requirement for Department deci-
sions is a preponderance of the evidence It is not 
necessary to meet criminal court standards of beyond 
reasonable doubt or overwhelming evidence Prepo-
nderance means evidence which is of greater weight 
or more convincing than the evidence which is 
offered in opposition to it, that is, evidence which as 
a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved is 
more probable than not Although the evidence that 
is required for an appeal decision must be of proba-
tive value, an initial determination must be made 
based on the best or most logical information avail-
able Sworn testimony or first-hand statements have 
greater believability than unsworn statements or 
hearsay A great deal of information is provided to 
the Department through telephone conversations and 
written reports. While the information provided in 
this manner will always be considered by the Depar-
tment, it cannot be relied upon more than credible 
sworn testimony when the parties have been given an 
I opportunity to present evidence in person 
Hearsay, which is information provided by a 
I source whose credibility cannot be tested through 
/ cross-examination, has inherent infirmities which 
make it unreliable The failure of one party to 
provide information either initially or at the appeals 
hearing severely limits the amount and quality of 
information upon which to base a good decision 
Therefore, it is necessary for all parties to actively 
participate in the decision making process by provi-
ding accurate and complete information in a timely 
manner to assure the protection of the interests of 
each party and preserve the social integrity of the 
unemployment insurance system 
19S7 35-4-2 
R475-3a. Bi-Weekly Payment of 
Benefits 
R475-3a-l. General Definition 
R475-3a-l. General Definition 
Eligibility for benefits is established with regard to 
a calendar week Benefits shall be paid on a bi-
weekly basis Therefore, benefits will not become due 
until the end of a two-week period for which ben-
efits are claimed in accordance with regulations 
governing the filing of claims 
19S7 35-Wa 
R475-3b. Weekly Benefit Amount 
R475-3b-l. General Definition 
R475-3b-2. Total Wages 
R475-3b-3. Early Determination 
R475-3b-4. Revision of Regular Monetary Determination 
R475-35-5. Wages Paid 
R475-3b-6. Wages Paid During the Quarter 
R475-35-7. Calendar Quarter 
R475-35-8. Retirement or Disability Retirement Income 
I R475-3b~l. General Definition 
This section of the Act outlines the procedure for 
! determining the Weekly Benefit Amount (WBA) and 
the Maximum Benefit Amount (MBA) which an eli-
gible claimant can receive and recomputations based 
on retirement income. Claimants are instructed when 
filing the initial claim to report all base period emp-
loyers. Employers are required by law to reporr to 
the Department the wages paid to all employees 
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at the time he files the first claim to be monetarily 
eligible for a second claim after the first benefit year 
ends. However, before benefits can be allowed on the 
second claim, the claimant who has received compe-
nsation during the first benefit year is required to 
have had work since the beginning of such year in 
order to qualify for compensation in his next benefit 
year. 
R475-4g-2. Successive Benefit Year 
A successive benefit year is not limited to a claim 
that begins the week following the last week of the 
original benefit year (transitional claim), but may 
affect any claimant who files a second claim. 
R475-4g-3. Subsequent Employment 
The elements of subsequent employment necessary 
to meet the requirements of this provision of the Act 
are: 
1. Insured Work 
The earnings must be in "covered employment* 
subject to a State or Federal unemployment insur-
ance program (including railroad employment) which 
can be used to establish monetary eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
2. The work must have been performed after the 
effective date of the original claim, but not necessa-
rily during the benefit year of the original claim. 
3. Actual services must have been performed, not 
just the establishment of covered wages attributable 
to a period of time subsequent to the effective date 
of the original claim such as vacation or severance 
pay. 
4. The covered earnings must be equal to at least 
six times the weekly benefit amount of the original or 
subsequent claim, whichever is lower. 
R475-4g-4. Period of Disqualification 
If the claimant meets the requirements of monetary 
eligibility under Section 35-4-4(0, he may establish 
a claim but benefits would be denied under this 
section from the effective date of the claim until the 
week in which the claimant provides proof of earn-
ings from subsequent employment as required to 
remove the disqualification. 
a. Exception to Disqualification 
The provisions of this section do not apply unless 
the claimant actually received compensation during 
the original benefit year. If the claimant never filed 
for a compensable week; was disqualified and no 
benefit checks were issued; or the original claim 
could be canceled under the Rules pertaining to 
Section 35-4-4(a), , :a disqualification under this 
section would not be assessed. 
19T7 35-Mf 
R475-5a. Voluntary Leaving 
R475-5a-U General Information 
R475-5a-2. Good Cause 
R475-5a-J. Equity and Good Conscience 
R475-5a-4. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a Spouse 
R475-5a-5. Evidence and Borden of Proof 
R475-5a-6. Quit or Discharge 
R475-5a-7. Examples of Specific Reasons for Separations 
R475-5a-S. Effective Dale of Disqualification 
R475-5a-l. General Informatioa 
Voluntarily leaving work means that the employee 
severed the employment relationship as contrasted to 
a separation initiated by the employer. This is true 
regardless of how compelling the claimant's reasons 
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were for making the decision to leave the work. 
Voluntary leaving will include not only leaving exis-
ting work, but also the failure to return to work after 
a lay-off, suspension; or period of absence. Volu-
ntary leaving also includes failure to renew a contract 
as in the case of a school teacher or athlete. The Act 
requires two standards of consideration following a 
voluntary separation from employment: good cause 
and equity and good conscience. If the claimant fails 
to establish good cause for leaving work, unemplo-
yment insurance benefits will not be denied if a 
denial of benefits would be contrary to the equity 
and good conscience standard. It is necessary to 
assess the totality of the employment situation. 
Where there are mitigating circumstances it may not 
be equitable to deny benefits. 
R475-5a-2. Good Cause 
1. Good cause is established if continuance of the 
employment would have had an adverse effect on the 
claimant which could not be controlled or prevented 
and necessitated immediate severance of the emplo-
yment relationship, or if the work was illegal, or 
unsuitable new work. 
a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
The separation must have been motivated by circ-
umstances which made continuance of the employ-
ment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficie-
ntly adverse to a reasonable person to outweigh the 
benefits of remaining employed. There must be a 
showing of actual or potential physical, mental, 
economic, personal or professional harm caused or 
aggravated by continuance in the employment. The 
claimant's reason(s) for belief of the consequences of 
remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary; 
substantial, not trifling. These circumstances must be 
applied as to the average individual, not the supers-
ensitive. 
b. Ability to Control or Prevent 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect 
on the claimant, good cause is not established if the 
claimant: 
(1) reasonably could have continued working while 
looking for other employment, or 
(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have 
made it possible for him to preserve his job through 
approved leave, transfer, or adjustment to personal 
circumstances, etc. or, 
(3) had not given the employer notice of the circ-
umstances causing the hardship so the employer 
would have an opportunity to make adjustment 
which would alleviate the need to quit. An employee 
with grievances about his employment must show an 
effort to work out the problems with the employer 
unless such efforts would be futile. 
c. Illegal 
Good cause is established if the individual was 
required to violate State or Federal law or his legal 
rights were violated; provided the employer was 
aware of the violation and refused to comply with 
the law. 
d. Unsuitable New Work 
Good cause may also be established if a claimant 
left new work which after a short trial period is 
shown to be materially unsuitable for the claimant 
consistent with the requirements of the suitable work 
test in Section 35-4-5(cXU and (2) of the Act. The 
fact that a job was accepted does not, in and of 
itself; make the job suitable. The longer a job is 
held, the more it tends to set the standard by which 
the suitability of the job is to be judged. After a 
reasonable period of time a contention that the quit 
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was motivated by unsuitability ot the job is no longer 
persuasive. 
R475-5a-3. Equity and Good Conscience 
When the circumstances of the quit were not suf-
ficiently compelling to justify an allowance of bene-
fits for good cause, but there were mitigating circu-
mstances, and a denial of benefits would be unreas-
onably harsh or an afront to fairness, benefits may 
be allowed under the provisions of equity and good 
conscience if all of the following- elements are 
present: 
a. the decision is made in cooperation with the 
employer by giving the employer an opportunity to 
provide information; 
b. the claimant acted reasonably; 
c. a denial would be inconsistent with the intent of 
the unemployment insurance program; and 
d. the claimant demonstrated a contmued attach-
ment to the labor market. 
2. The elements of equity and good conscience are 
defined as follows: 
a. In Cooperation with the Employer 
In administering the unemployment insurance 
program, the intent of the Department is to maintain 
a careful balance between claimants and employers 
and to make fairness the uppermost consideration. 
The employer is given an opportunity to provide 
information when the Department notifies him that a 
former employee has filed a claim for benefits. Such 
notice provides an opportunity to explain the reason 
for separation. The employer is also notified of any 
appeal with regard to the separation except as prov-
ided under Section 35-4-4<e). 
b. The Claimant Acted Reasonably 
Reasonable is defined as those actions which make 
the decision to quit logical, sensible or practical. The 
actions which might be acceptable for a member of a 
subculture are not the norm by which reasonableness 
is established. There must be mitigating circumsta-
nces which, although not compelling, may be consi-
dered as motivating a reasonable person to take 
similar action. 
c. Consistent with the Purposes of the Act 
The intent of the Act is to temper the hardships 
associated with unemployment and to provide stabi-
lity for the economy by maintaining purchasing 
power, individual skills and a stable workforce. 
d. Continued Attachment to the Labor Market. 
The claimant establishes his contmued attachment 
to the labor market by taking positive action(s) which 
could result in employment during the first week 
after leaving work and each week thereafter. Attac-
hment to the labor market is demonstrated by such 
actions as making contacts with prospective emplo-
yers, preparing resumes, developing job leads, etc. 
Such a work search should have been undertaken 
without instructions from the Department. Failure to 
show attachment to the labor market during the first 
week of unemployment may be allowed if it was not 
practical for the individual to seek work in circums-
tances such as: illness, hospitalization, incarceration, 
or for other reasons beyond the control of the clai-
mant provided a worksearch was commenced as soon 
as practical. 
R475-5a-4. Quit to Accompany, Follow or Join a 
Spouse 
1. An individual leaves work without good cause, 
regardless of the reason for the move, if he or she 
quit to move with, follow or jom, a lawful wife or 
husband, to or in a new place of residence from 
which it is not practical to commute to the employ-
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mem Even if such necessitous circumstances as the 
expense of maintaining two separate households, or 
the need to keep a family together, were factors m 
the decision to move, benefits cannot be allowed. 
The Utah Legislature has chosen not to insure this 
aspect ot domestic life. The only exception to this 
provision is where a claimant quits to accompany a 
spouse who is compelled to move to a new locale for 
medical reasons which are beyond the control of the 
spouse. 
R475-5a-5. Evidence and Burden of Proof 
Since the claimant is the moving party m a volun-
tary separation, he is the best source of information 
with regard to the reasons for the quit. The claimant 
has the burden of proof and must show that he had 
"good cause* for quitting, or that he meets the req-
uirements for allowance under the equity and good 
conscience provision before benefits can be allowed. 
R475-5a-6. Quit or Discharge 
1. Refusal to Follow Instructions Constructive 
Abandonment 
If the claimant knew his job would be forfeit upon 
failure to follow reasonable requests or instructions, 
but chose not to comply, the resultant separation was 
a quit, not a discharge. 
2. Leaving Prior to Effective Date of Termination 
a. When a worker leaves prior to the date of an 
impending reduction in force, he will be considered 
to have quit. A worker has an obligation to remain 
on the job until the work is completed. Notice of an 
impending layoff is not good cause to leave in order 
to get a head start in searching for other work. 
However, the duration of available work may be a 
mitigating factor in determining good cause of equity 
and good conscience, depending upon the reason for 
the decision to quit. If it is determined that the clai-
mant is not disqualified under Section 35-4-5(a), 
benefits shall be denied under Section 35-4-4(c) 
for the hunted period of time the claimant had been 
told by the employer that he could have contmued 
working, as he failed to accept all available, suitable 
work for such weeks. 
b. An individual cannot escape a disqualification 
under Section 35-4-5(b)(l) by quitting in advance 
of a virtually certain discharge which would result m 
a denial of benefits. Such a separation shall be 
treated as a discharge. 
3. Leaving Work Because of a Disciplinary Action 
If the disciplinary action or suspension is reason-
able and non-discnminatory, leaving work rather 
than submit to such actions, or failing to return to 
work at the end of the suspension, is considered to 
be a voluntary quit without good cause unless the 
claimant was previously disqualified under the pro-
visions of Section 35-4-5(b)(l). 
4. Failure to Return at the End of a Leave of 
Absence 
When a claimant takes a leave of absence for any 
reason and files a claim while still on leave from his 
employer, he will be considered "unemployed* even 
though he still has an attachment to the employer. 
However, his reason for taking the leave of absence 
will determine if he had good cause for quitting. If 
the claimant fads to return to work at the end of the 
leave of absence, this is also considered a voluntary 
quit which must result in a denial of benefits if the 
claimant cannot show good cause or that a denial 
would be contrary to equity and good conscience. 
5. Leaving Due to a Remark or Action of the 
Employer or a Co-Worker 
When a worker interprets remarks of co-workers 
663 
R475-5a-7 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 1989 
or supervisors to mean he is to be discnarged, the 
claimant has the responsibility to assure himself, 
prior to leaving that the employer intended to term-
mate the employment relationship and to contmue 
working until the date of the discharge If he fails to 
do so, or was not to be discharged, he left work 
voluntarily 
6 Resignation Intended 
a. When a worker submits his resignation to be 
effective at some definite future date, but is discha-
rged prior to that date, the leaving is involuntary 
because the immediate cause of the separation is the 
result of the employer's action However, the worker 
who states that he is quittmg, but agrees to contmue 
working for an indefinite period of time and will 
leave at the convenience of the employer, leaves 
voluntarily even though the date of separation is 
determined by the employer 
b When a worker resigns and later changes his 
mind and attempts to remain employed, the reason-
ableness of the employer's refusal to contmue the 
employment is the determining factor in deciding if 
the claimant quit or was discharged For example if 
the employer had already hired a replacement, or 
taken other action because of the claimant's impen-
ding quit, it may not be practical for the employer to 
allow the claimant to withdraw his resignation and it 
would be held that the separation was voluntary 
R475-5a-7 Examples of Specific Reasons for 
Separations 
In all the following examples, the basic elements of 
good cause or equity and good conscience must be 
considered in determining eligibility for benefits The 
following examples do not include all reasons for 
leaving employment 
1 Prospects of Other Work 
Good cause is established if at the time of separa-
tion the claimant had a definite and immediate ass-
urance of another job or self-employment that was 
reasonably expected to be full-time and permanent 
Occasionally, after giving notice, but prior to leavmg 
the first job, the individual learns that the new job 
will not be available when promised, permanent, full-
time, or otherwise suitable Good cause is established 
in such circumstances if the claimant immediately 
attempted, unless such an attempt was obviously 
futile, to rescind his notice of impendmg quit and 
continue working with his current employer 
However, if it is apparent the claimant knew, or 
should have known, about the unsuitabdity of the 
new work, but quits the first job and subsequently 
also leaves the new job, a disqualification will apply 
from the time the claimant quit the first job 
a. A definite assurance of another job means that 
the claimant has personally been in contact with 
someone in authority to hire, been given a definite 
date to begin working and told under what condit-
ions he will be hired. If he has been told of a possi-
bility of a job opening and to report at the job site 
this circumstance implies only that he will be consi-
dered for hire, not a definite assurance of lure Mere 
rumors of job openings are not job offers Prospects 
of other work developed after leaving are relevant 
only m showing a genuine attachent to the labor 
force. 
b. An immediate assurance of another job means 
that the prospective job will begin within two weeks, ] 
barring necessitous circumstances, of the last day of 
work on the job he is leavmg. Benefits would be 
denied under the provisions of Section 35-4-4<c) if 
the claimant files during the interim between the two 
jobs If the job is to begin at a future date which is 
tentative and dependent on circumstances which 
cannot be definitely predicted the claimant does not 
have good cause for leavmg work 
2 Part time Work and Reduction of Hours 
I a The reduction of an employee's working hours 
! alone is not good cause for leavmg the job A reas-
i onable person will remain partially employed as 
opposed to severing the relationship with the empl-
oyer If the claimant is earning less than his weekly 
benefit amount, he could receive a partial unemplo-
yment insurance check even though he has not been 
separated from the employer In extreme cases, 
however, a reduction of hours may be so detrimental 
to the employee that the circumstances justify 
leaving All of the following elements are necessary 
to establish good cause for quittmg without first 
obtaining other employment 
(1) The reduction involves a substantial number of 
hours in proportion to the number of hours normally 
worked 
(2) The reduction is permanent or expected to be 
of a long duration 
(3) The reduction in hours causes a senous finan-
cial burden, or adverse effect on personal circumst-
ances such as transportation, childcare, etc , resulting 
in a real hardship and fhe claimant could not make 
reasonable adjustments to his personal circumstances 
prior to quitting 
(4) The claimant was not advised at the time he 
was hired that a reduction of hours was possible or 
pendmg or the reduction in the hours was not a 
customary and known condition of the job as in the 
case of school employees or seasonal workers 
(5) The reduction was not at the request of the 
claimant, was beyond the claimant's control, and the 
claimant attempted m good faith to avoid the redu-
ction in hours (except where such an attempt was 
clearly futile) by discussing the circumstances with 
the employer and accepting all work which was rea-
sonably available 
b If any of the foregoing five elements are not 
present and good cause cannot be shown, the provi-
sions of equity and good conscience may apply where 
there are mitigating circumstances or the reduction in 
hours was substantially unfair to the claimant Miti-
gating circumstances include such things as (1) pro-
spects of full-time work exist, but cannot be 
pursued while continuing to work part-tune, (2) the 
employer failed to comply with prior representations 
he made to the claimant, (3) the claimant made prior 
concessions for the benefit of the employer such as 
specialized training, relocation, etc , (4) the reduction 
in hours was not equitably distributed or based on a 
rational basis, such as seniority or job requirements 
3 Personal Circumstances 
There may be personal circumstances which are 
sufficiently compelling or create sufficient hardship 
to justify leavmg work, provided the individual made 
reasonable attempts to make adjustments or find 
alternatives 
4 Leavmg to Attend School 
Leavmg work to attend school might be justified 
on general principles but is not good cause for bec-
oming unemployed within the meaning of the Act. 
5. Conscientious Objection 
For religious concerns to establish good cause for 
quittmg there must be evidence that the effects of 
continuing work would conflict with good faith, 
honestly held religious convictions. This does not 
necessarily mean that any personal belief, no matter 
how unique, is entitled to this protection However, 
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beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others or shared by all members 
of a religious sect in order to be good faith religious 
convictions. Where the individual was not called 
upon, as a condition of his employment, to violate 
his religious beliefs, he is not compelled to quit. A 
general abhorrence of war does not show a compel-
ling need to quit work at an armory nor does mem-
bership in a religion which counsels _against the use 
of alcohol preclude employment in a grocery store or 
restaurant where alcoholic beverages are sold. A 
decision not to continue working under conditions 
which conflict with convictions does not justify 
leaving work unless there is evidence of a good faith 
change in personal convictions as shown by a change 
in lifestyle. However, a change in the job requiring 
work in conflict with personal or religious convict-
ions is good cause for leaving if the claimant has not 
previously worked under such conditions and the 
employer will not make adjustments. 
6. Distance 
An employee has the responsibility to arrange 
transportation to and from work within normal 
commuting patterns, unless it is customary in that 
job or occupation for the employer to provide tran-
sportation. When lack of transportation, beyond the 
control of the individual, prevents continuance of the 
work, good cause may be established provided the 
claimant has no other alternate means of transport-
ation. An individual's preference for a discontinued 
mode of transportation to a substantially equal one is 
not good cause. The mere inconvenience of one kind 
of transportation as compared with another should 
not be confused with hardship. When a change in 
residence results in an increased distance to work 
beyond normal commuting patterns, the reason for 
the move, not the distance to the work, is the factor 
which determines if the claimant quit with good 
cause. 
7. Marriage 
a. When an individual leaves work to be married, 
such a personal choice is not good cause for quitting, 
even if the intended residence of the couple was too 
far for the claimant to commute to the work. 
b. When the employer has a rule that requires 
separation of an employee who marries a co-
worker, the separation is involuntary even though the 
employer may leave it to the couple to decide who 
will leave. 
8. Health or Physical Condition 
a. A worker generally consults a physician prior to 
quitting to determine if the job was actually a factor 
contributing to the health problem. Although it is 
not essential for the claimant to have been advised by 
a physician to quit, a contention that health prob-
lems required the separation must be established by 
competent evidence. Even if the work causes or 
aggravates a health problem, if there are alternatives, 
such as treatment or medication, or the conditions of 
the work can be changed to alleviate the problem, 
good cause for quitting is not established. 
b. Leaving work because of an employer's failure 
to comply with government regulations concerning 
health and safety is good cause provided the empl-
oyer was told of the problem and did not take corr-
-ective action. The degree of risk to health and safety 
must be substantial before leaving could be consid-
ered good cause. 
'c. Some conditions of work, although meeting 
government safety and health standards, may present 
an undue risk to a particular worker because of 
unique personal conditions. Allergy is one example 
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of unique circumstances that might require a job 
change or adjustment. However, if the nsk to health 
or safety is one borne by ail those employed in the 
occupation and the claimant fails to show he was 
affected to a greater extent than the other workers in 
the same occupation, good cause for leaving is not 
established. A fear of potential health and safety 
problems is not good cause for quitting unless the 
claimant can show that the fear is justified. 
d. Pregnancy is treated as any other temporary 
disability. Employers generally provide maternity 
leave if leave is provided for other medical disabili-
ties. If leave is available, the claimant voluntarily 
quits by failing to accept or arrange leave or failing 
to return at the end of the leave. 
9. Retirement and Pension 
Leaving work solely to accept retirement benefits is 
not a compelling reason for quitting. Although it 
may be reasonable for an individual to take advan-
tage of a retirement benefit, payment of unemploy-
ment benefits in such a circumstance would not be 
consistent with the intent of the Unemployment Ins-
urance program, and, therefore, a denial of benefits 
would not be contrary to equity and good consci-
ence. However, if the employer required the empl-
oyee to leave work at a certain age, or after an est-
ablished number of years, the separation was invol-
untary. 
10. Sexual Harassment 
a. A claimant may have good cause for leaving if 
the quit was due to discriminatory and unlawful 
sexual harassment, provided the employer was given 
a chance to take necessary action to alleviate the 
objectionable conduct. Sexual harassment is a form 
of sex discrimination which is prohibited by Title VII 
of the U. S. Civil Rights Act. Sexual harassment is 
intimidation by a person of either sex against a 
person of the opposite or same sex. For sexual har-
assment to be discriminatory, the following three 
elements must be shown to exist: 
(1) Unwanted conduct or communication of a 
sexual nature which adversely affects a person's 
employment relationship or working environment, if: 
(a) submission to the conduct is either an explicit 
or implicit term or condition of employment, or 
(b) submission to or rejection of the conduct is 
used as a basis for an employment decision affecting 
the person, or 
(c) the conduct has a purpose or effect of substa-
ntially interfering with a person's work performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
work environment, 
(2) Unsolicited, deliberately sexual statements, 
gestures or physical contacts which are objectionable 
to the recipient, 
(3) Undermines the integrity of the workplace, 
destroys morale and offends legal and social stand-
ards of acceptable behavior. 
b. Inappropriate behavior which has sexual conn-
otation but does not meet the test of sexual discrim-
ination is insufficient to establish good cause for 
leaving work. 
11. Discrimination 
It is also a violation of Federal law to discriminate 
against any individual with respect to his compensa-
tion, terms, conditions* or privileges of employment, 
because of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin; or to limit, segregate, or classify 
employees in any way which would deprive or tend 
to deprive an individual of employment opportunities 
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an empl-
oyee because of the individual's race, color, religion. 
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sex or national origin. 
R475-5a-8. Effective Date of Disqualification 
1. The disqualification under this section technic-
ally begins with the week the claimant voluntarily 
quit the job. However, to avoid the confusion which 
arises when a disqualification is made for a period of 
time prior to the filing of a claim, the claimant will 
be notified that benefits are denied beginning with 
the effective date of a new or reopened claim. The 
disqualification continues until the claimant returns 
to work in a bona fide covered employment and 
earns six times his weekly benefit amount after the 
week in which the claimant left work. A disqualific-
ation which begins in one benefit year will continue 
into a new benefit year unless purged by subsequent 
earnings. 
2. If an individual is receiving remuneration which 
is attributed to a period of time following the last 
day of work, such as severance or vacation pay, the 
"week in which the claimant left work" is considered 
to be the last week for which such remuneration was 
attributable as an individual is not "unemployed" 
while receiving remuneration from an employer, and 
such severance- or vacation pay cannot be used to 
purge a disqualification. 
1987 35-4-5. 
R475-5b. Discharge and Discharge for 
Crime 
R475-5b-l. Discharge 
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Crime 
R475-5b-l. Discharge 
I. General Definition 
Ordinarily accepted concepts of justice are used in 
determining if a discharge is disqualifying under the 
"just cause" provisions of the Act. Just cause is 
defined as a job separation that is necessary due to 
the seriousness of actual or potential harm to the 
employer provided the claimant had knowledge of 
the employer's expectations and had control over the 
circumstances which ltd to the discharge. Just cause 
is not established if the reason for the discharge is 
baseless, arbitrary or capricious or the employer has 
failed to uniformly, apply reasonable standards to all 
employees when instituting disciplinary action. The 
purpose of this section is to deny benefits to indivi-
duals who bring about their own unemployment by 
r conducting themselves, with respect to their emplo-
yment with callousness, misbehavior, or lack of 
consideration to such a degree that the employer, was 
justified in discharging the employee.' However, when 
' an employee is discharged by his employer,; such 
discharge may have been the result of incompetence, 
lack of skill, or other reasons which aretjeyond the 
claimant's control. The question which must be est-
ablished by the evidence is whether the 'claimant is at 
fault in his resulting unemployment.^ Unemployment 
insurance benefits will be denied if the employer had 
just cause for discharging the employee. However, 
not every cause for discharge provides a basis to I 
deny benefits. In order to have just cause for disch- I 
arge pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l) there _ must 
be some fault on the part of the employee involved. 
II. Just Cause ^ 
J. The basic factors wnicn estaonsn just cause* and' 
are essential for a determination of ineligibility are: 
a. Culpability 
. This is the seriousness of the conduct or,the seve-
rity of the offense as it affects continuance of the 
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employment relationship. The discharge must have 
been necessary to avoid actual or potential harm to 
the employer's rightful interests. A discharge would 
not be considered "necessary" if it is not consistent 
with reasonable employment practices. The wrong-
ness of the conduct must be considered in the context 
of the particular employment and how it affects the 
employer's rights. If the conduct was an isolated 
incident of poor judgment and there is no expecta-
tion that the conduct will be continued or repeated, 
potential harm may not be shown and therefore it is 
not necessary to discharge the employee. 
(1) Longevity and prior work record are important 
in determining if the act or omission is an isolated 
I incident or a good faith error in judgment. An 
employee who has historically complied with work 
rules does not demonstrate by a single violation, even 
though harmful, that such violations will be repeated 
and therefore require discharge to avoid future harm 
to the employer. For example: A long term employee 
who does not have a history oi tardiness or absent-
eeism is absent without leave for a number of days 
due to a death in his immediate family. Although 
this is a violation of the employer's rules and may 
establish just cause for discharging a new employee, 
the fact that the employee has established over a long 
period of time that he complies with attendance rules 
shows that the circumstance is more of an isolated 
incident rather than a violation of the rules that is or 
could be expected to be habitual. In this case because 
the potential for harm to the employer is not shown, 
it is not necessary for the employer to discharge the 
employee, and therefore just cause is not established, 
b. Knowledge 
The employee must have had a knowledge of the 
'conduct which the employer expected. It is not nec-
essary that the claimant intended to cause harm to 
the employer, but he should reasonably have been 
able to anticipate the effect his conduct would have. 
Knowledge may not be established unless the empl-
oyer gave a clear, explanation of the expected beha-
vior or had a pertinent written policy, except in the 
case of a flagrant violation of a universal standard of 
behavior. If the employer's expectations are unclear, 
ambiguous or inconsistent, the existence of knowl-
edge is not shown. A specific warning is one way of 
showing that - the employee had knowledge of the 
expected conduct. After the employee is given ^  a 
warning he should be given an opportunity to correct 
objectionable conduct. Additional violations« occur-
ring- after the warning would be necessary to establish 
just cause for a discharge. 
(1) For Example: When the employer has an esta-
blished procedure of progressive discipline,- such 
procedures generally must have been followed in 
order to establish that the employee had knowledge 
of the expected behavior or the seriousness of the 
act. The exception is that very severe conduct, such 
as criminal actions, may justify immediate discharge 
without following a progressive disciplinary program. 
c. Control 
The conduct must have been within the power and 
capacity of the claimant to control or prevents, 
2. Just cause may not be established when the 
reason for discharge is based on such things as mere 
mistakes, inefficiencyr failure, of < performance as the 
jesult of inability or incapacity, inadvertence in iso-
lated instances, good faith errors in judgment or in 
the exercise of discretion, minor but casual or unin-
tentional carelessness or negligence, etc. These, exa-
mples of conduct are not disqualifying because of the 
lack of knowledge or control-. However,* continued 
_ _ _ 
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inefficiency, repeated carelessness, or lack of care 
exercised by ordinary, reasonable workers in similar 
circumstances, may be disquahfymg dependmg on 
the reason and degree of the carelessness, the know-
ledge and control of the employee. 
3. The term "just cause" as used m Section 5(b)(1) 
does not lessen the requirement that there be some 
fault on the part of the employee involved. Prior to 
the 1983 addition of the term "just cause" the Com-
mission interpreted Section 5(b)(1) to require an int-
entional infliction of harm or intentional disregard of 
the employer's interests. The intent of the Legisla-
ture m adding the words "just cause" to Section 
5(b)(1) was apparently to correct this restrictive int-
erpretation. While some fault must be present, it is 
sufficient that the acts were intended, the conseque-
nces were reasonably foreseeable, and that such acts 
have senous effect on. the employee's job or the 
employer's interests. 
III. Burden of Proof 
1 In a discharge, the employer initiates the sepa-
ration and, as such, is the primary source of infor-
mation with regard to the reasons for the dismissal 
The employer has the burden of proof which is the 
responsibility to establish the facts resulting in the 
discharge. The employer is required by the Statute in 
Section 35-4-11(g) to keep accurate records and to 
provide correct information to the Department for 
proper administration of the Act. Although the 
employer has the burden to establish just cause for 
the discharge, if sufficient facts are obtained from 
the claimant, a decision will be made based on the 
information available The failure of one party to 
provide information does not necessarily result m a 
ruling favorable to the other party 
2. All mterested parties have the right to give reb-
uttal to information contrary to the interests of that 
party 
IV. Quit or Discharge 
The determination of whether a separation is a 
quit or a discharge is made by the Department based 
on the circumstances which resulted m the separa-
tion. The conclusions on the employer's records, the 
separation notice or the claimant's report are not 
controlling on the Department. 
1. Discharge Before Effective Date of Resignation 
When an individual notifies an employer that he 
intends to leave as of a definite date in the future 
and is discharged pnor to that date, the cause for the 
separation on the day the separation takes place is 
the controlling factor in determining whether it was a 
quit or discharge. Although the separation might 
have been motivated by the claimant's announced 
resignation* the employer was the moving party in 
ending the employment pnor to the resignation date. 
Therefore, the immediate reason was more closely 
related to the employer's action than to the clai-
mant's announced intention to quit. Unless disqual-
ifying conduct is involved, the separation is consid-
ered to be for the convenience of the employer. 
However, if the employee is merely reheved of work, 
responsibilities but is paid through the date of his 
announced resignation it is not a di*£harce hut a 
quit. 
2. Leaving in Anticipation of Discharge 
When an employee leaves work in anticipation of a 
possible discharge or layoff, and if the reason for the 
discharge would not be disquahfymg, the separation 
is generally considered to be a voluntary quit. 
However, an individual who leaves work to avoid 
virtually certain discharge for disqualifying conduct 
cannot thereby avoid the disquahfymg provisions of 
irity/Job Service R475-5b-l 
Section 35-4-5(b), and the separation is considered 
a discharge rather than voluntary leavmg 
3 Employee Knows His Action will Result in 
Discharge 
Absence taken without permission, or other actions 
contrary to specific reasonable instructions from the 
employer, are generally considered a voluntary sep-
aration rather than discharge, if the worker was 
given a choice of complying or bemg separated 
V Disciplinary Suspension or Involuntary Furl-
ough 
When an employee is put on a disciplinary suspe-
nsion or involuntary furlough, he may meet the 
definition of "unemployed " If the claimant files 
during the suspension or furlough, the reason for the 
suspension or furlough must be adjudicated as a 
discharge, even though the claimant is still attached 
to the employer and expects to return to work. A 
suspension which was reasonable and necessary to 
prevent potential harm to the employer or to main-
tain necessary discipline would generally result in a 
disqualification under this section provided the ele-
ments of control and knowledge are present Failure 
to return to work at the the end of the definite 
period of suspension or furlough would be consid-
ered a voluntary quit and eligibility would then be 
determined consistent with Section 35-4-5(a), if 
the claimant had not been previously denied 
VI Proximal Cause Relauon of Offenses to 
Discharge 
1. The cause for discharge is that conduct which 
motivates the employer to make the decision to ter-
minate the employee's services If the decision has 
truly been made, it is generally demonstrated by way 
of notice to the employee or the initiation of a pers-
onnel action. Although the employer mav learn of 
other offenses following the making of the decision 
to terminate, the reason for the discharge is limited 
to that conduct of which the employer was aware 
pnor to making the decision. However, if the empl-
oyer discharges a person because of some preliminary 
evidence of certain conduct, but does not obtain all 
of the proof of the conduct until after the separation 
notice is given, it could still be concluded that the 
discharge was caused by that conduct which the 
employer was investigating. Eligibility for benefits 
will then be determined by considering the extent of 
culpability, knowledge and control. 
2. When the discharge does not occur immediately 
after the employer becomes aware of an offense, a 
presumption arises that there were other reasons for 
the discharge. This relationship between the offense 
and the discharge must be established both as to 
cause and tune. The presumption that the conduct 
was not the cause of the discharge may-be overcome 
by a showing that the delay was due to such things as 
investigation, arbitration, or hearings conducted with 
regard to the employee's conduct. When a grievance 
or arbitration is pending with respect to the disch-
arge, the Department's decision will be based on the 
information available to the Department. The Dep-
artment's decision is not binding on the grievance 
resolution process or an arbitrator and the decision 
of the arbitrator is not binding On the Department. 
When an employer is faced with the necessity of a 
reduction in his workforce but uses an employee's 
pnor conduct as the criteria for determining who- will 
be laid off,, the lack of work is the primary motiva-
tion or cause of the discharge, not the conduct. 
VII. In Connection with Employment 
Disquahfymg conduct is not limited to offenses 
which take place on the employer's premises or 
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during business hours. It is only necessary that the 
conduct have such "connection" to the employee's 
duties and to the employer's business that it is a 
subject of legitimate and significant concern to the 
employer. All employers, both public and private 
have the right to expect employees to refrain from 
acts which are detrimental to the business or would 
bring dishonor on the business name or the institu-
tion. Legitimate interests of employers include, but 
are not limited to: goodwill, of customers, reputation 
of the busmess, efficiency, business costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty. 
VIII. Examples of Reasons for Discharge 
In ail the following examples, the basic elements of 
just cause must be considered in determining eligibi-
lity for benefits. The following examples do not 
include all reasons for discharge. 
1. Violation of Company Rules 
If an employee violates reasonable rules of the 
employer and the three elements of culpability, 
knowledge and control are established, benefits must 
be denied. 
a. The reasonableness of the employer's rules will 
depend on the necessity for such a rule as it affects 
the employer's interests. Rules which are contrary to 
general public policy or which infringe upon the 
recognized rights and privileges of individuals may 
not be reasonable. An employer must have broader 
prerogatives in regulating conduct when employees 
are on the job than when they are not. An employer 
must be able to make rules for employee on-the-
job conduct that reasonably further the legitimate 
business interests of the employer. An employer is 
not required to impose only minimum standards, but 
there may be some justifiable cause for violations of 
rules that are unreasonable or unduly harsh, rigorous 
or exacting. When rules are changed, adequate notice 
and reasonable opportunity to comply must be aff-
orded. If the employee believes a rule is unreason-
able, he has the responsibility to discuss his concerns 
with the employer and give the employer an opport-
unity to take corrective action. 
b. Discharges may be regulated by an employment 
contract or collective bargaining agreement. Just 
cause for the discharge is not established if the 
employee's conduct was consistent with his rights 
under such contract or the discharge was contrary to 
the provisions of such contract. 
c. Habitual offenses may not be disqualifying 
conduct if it is found that the act was condoned by 
the employer or was so prevalent as to be customary. 
However, when the worker is given notice that the 
conduct will no longer be tolerated, further violations' 
could result in a denial of benefits. 
d. Culpability may be established even if the result 
of the violation of the rule does not in and of itself 
cause harm to the employer, but the resultant lack of 
compliance with rules diminishes the employer's 
ability to have order and control. Culpability is est-
ablished if termination of the employee was required 
to maintain necessary discipline in the company. 
e. Knowledge of the employer's - standards of 
behavior is usually provided in the form of verbal 
instructions, written rules and/or warnings. 
However, the warning is not always necessary for a 
disqualification to apply in cases of violations-of a 
serious nature of universal standards of conduct of 
which the claimant should have been aware without 
being warned. 
2. Attendance Violations 
a. It is the duty of the worker to be punctual and 
remain at work within the reasonable requirements of 
the employer. Discharge for unjustified absence or 
tardiness is considered disqualifying if the worker 
knows that he is violating attendance rules. Such 
violations are generally a serious matter of concern 
to employers as attendance standards are necessary to 
maintain order, control, and productivity. Discharge 
for an attendance violation beyond the control of the 
worker is not disqualifying unless the worker reaso-
nably could have given notice or obtained permission 
consistent with the employer's rules. 
b. In cases of termination for violations of atten-
dance standards, the employee's recent history of 
attendance shall be considered to determine if the 
violation is an isolated incident, or demonstrates a 
pattern of unjustified absences within the control of 
the employee. Flagrant misuse of attendance privil-
eges may result in a denial of benefits even if the last 
incident was beyond the employee's control. 
3. Falsification of Work Record 
a. The duty of honesty is inherent in any employee/ 
employer relationship. A statement made in an app-
lication for a job may be considered as connected 
with the work, even though it is made before the 
work begins. An individual begins his obligations as 
an employee when he makes an application for work. 
One of those obligations is to give the employer 
truthful answers to all material questions. Any fals-
ification of information which may operate to expose 
the employer to possible loss, litigation, or damage 
would be considered material and therefore may 
establish culpability. If the claimant made a false 
statement while applying for work in order to be 
hired, benefits may be denied even if the claimant 
would have otherwise remained unemployed and 
eligible for the receipt of unemployment benefits 
depending upon the degree of knowledge, culpability 
and control. 
4. Insubordination 
Authority is required in the work place to maintain 
order and efficiency. An employer has the right to 
expect that lines of authority will be maintained; that 
reasonable orders, given in a civil manner, will be 
obeyed; that supervisors will be respected and that 
their authority will not be undermined. In determi-
ning when insubordination (resistance to authority) 
becomes disqualifying conduct, the fact that there 
was a disregard of the employer's interests is the 
major importance. Merc protests or dissatisfaction 
without an overt art is not in disregard of the empl-
oyer's interests. However, provocative remarks to a 
superior or vulgar or profane language in response to 
a civil request may be insubordination if it is cond-
ucive to disruption of routine, negation df authority 
and impairment of efficiency." Mere incompatibility 
or emphatic insistence or discussion by an employee 
who was acting in good faith is not disqualifying 
conduct. 
5. Loss of License 
When an employee loses a license which he knows 
is required for the performance of the job, and the 
individual had control over the- circumstances which, 
resulted in the loss of the license, such conduct is 
disqualifying. For example, if the claimant worked as 
a driver, and lost his license because of a conviction 
for driving under the influence -(DUI), culpability- is 
established if he fails to obtain a permit to drive at 
work or the conviction would expose the employer to 
additional liabilities. The employer cannot authorize 
an employee to drive in • violation of the law.-- Also, 
additional insurance costs or other: liabilities^ are a 
legitimate concern o f the employer.^Knowledge is 
established because it is a matter of common know-
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ledge in the State of Utah that driving under the 
influence of alcohol is a violation of the law and is 
punishable by loss of the individual's driving privil-
eges. Judicial notice can be taken of this fact because 
a question relative to this matter is on every driver's 
license test. He had control in that he made a cons-
cious decision to risk loss of the license when he 
failed to make arrangements for transportation prior 
to becoming under the influence of intoxicants. 
IX. Effective Date of Disqualification 
The Act provides that any disqualification under 
this section will include "the week in which the clai-
mant was discharged . . . " However, to avoid conf-
usion, the denial of benefits will begin with the 
Sunday of the week for which claimant has filed for 
benefits. 
R475-5b-2. Discharge for Crime 
I. General Definition 
1. A crime is a punishable act in violation of law; 
an offense against the State or the United States. 
"Crime" and "Misdemeanor* are synonymous terms; 
though in common usage crime is used to denote 
offenses of a more serious nature. However, for 
example: an insignificant, although illegal act, or the 
taking of something which is of little or no value, or 
believed to have been abandoned may not be suffic-
ient to establish that a crime was committed as 
defined for the application of this section of the Act, 
even if the claimant was found guilty of a violation 
of the law. 
2. The duty of honesty is implied in any employ-
ment relationship. A worker is obligated to deal with 
his employer in truthfulness and good faith. An 
-individual discharged for dishonesty constituting a 
crime connected with his work is at fault in his res-
ulting unemployment. The 52 week disqualification 
for "dishonesty constituting a crime" required by the 
statute is a mandatory penalty. 
3. The basic factors which are essential for a dis-
qualification under this provision of the law are that 
the individual was discharged for a crime that was: 
a. In connection with work 
b. Dishonesty 
c. Admitted or established by a conviction in a 
court of law 
II. In Connection with Work 
The connection to the work is not limited to offe-
nses which take place on the employer's premises or 
during business hours. The employer does not have 
to be the victim of the crime, but the crime must 
adversely affect the employer's rightful interest. It is 
necessary that the conduct have a 'connection* to 
the employee's duties and to the employer's business 
that it is a subject of legitimate and significant 
concern. All employers, both public and private, 
have the right to expect employees to refrain from 
acts which are detrimental to the business or would 
bring dishonor on the business name of the institu-
tion. ' Legitimate interests of employers include, but 
are not limited to: goodwill of customers, reputation 
of the business, efficiency, business costs, morale of 
employees, discipline, honesty, trust and loyalty. 
III. Dishonesty 
Dishonesty in this context generally means theft 
but may also include other criminal acts connected 
with the "work that render the employee untrustwo-
rthy or show a lack of integrity. Dishonesty not 
involving a crime may still be disaualifvine under 
provisions of Section 5(b)(1). 
IV. Admission or Conviction in a Court j 
1. An admission is a voluntary acknowledgement 
CODE* Co 
Provo. Utali 
made by a claimant that he has committed acts which 
are in violation of the law. In this context, the 
admission may be a verbal or written statement by 
the claimant that he committed the act. The admis-
sion does not necessarily have to be made to a Dep-
artment representative. However, there must be suf-
ficient information to establish that it was not a. false 
statement given under duress or made to obtain some 
concession. 
2. A conviction is when a claimant has been found 
guilty by a court of committing acts which are in 
violation of the law. When the claimant pleads "no 
contest" or agrees to the diversionary program as 
provided by the court, this is treated, for the purp-
oses of this section of the Act, the same as a convi-
ction and benefits will be denied. 
V. Benefits Held in Abeyance 
1. If the claimant has not made an admission, but 
is held in legal custody or free on bail, the law req-
uires a withholding of a determination of eligibility. 
Benefits cannot be paid unless a determination of 
eligibility is made. Failure to pay benefits even 
though the burden of proof for a denial under 
Section 5(b)(2) has not been met is justified because 
the court, in holding the claimant in legal custody or 
establishing bail has made a preliminary ruling that 
the state has established that a crime has been com-
mitted and there is reason to believe the individual 
committed that crime. The filing of charges is not the 
same as being held in custody. 
2. However, if there is a preponderance of evid-
ence that the act was committed, a denial of benefits 
should be made under Section 35-4-5(b)(l), if 
charges have not been filed by the employer within 
four weeks. In such a case, the decision under 
Section 35-4-5(b)(l) will advise the claimant that a 
decision under Section 35-4-5(b)(2) is still * pending 
and the 5(b)(1) disqualification shall be changed to a 
5(b)(2) disqualification if the claimant is found guilty 
by the court. If the claimant has purged a 5(b)(1) 
disqualification which was or could be assessed 
pending a ruling by the court, benefits must be held 
in abeyance until the court reaches the verdict. The 
claimant has the responsibility to provide the Depa-
rtment with the court's verdict in order to establish 
eligibility. 
3. If a determination of eligibility is held in abey-
ance the claimant must be notified in a written deci-
sion that benefits are being withheld in accordance 
with Section 35-4-5(b)(2) pending a determination 
by the court. 
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R475-5C-*. Equity and Good Conscience 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Workmen's compensation or the occupa- Plaintiff may qualify under the statute for 
tionai disease laws." the freezing of the base period where the bene-
"Workmens compensation or the occupa- fits received were federal social security bene-
tional disease laws" modifies only "this state" fits if the benefits were received as compensa-
and not "federal law" in this section. DeLuca v. tion for sickness or illness. DeLuca v. Depart-
Department of Emp. Sec. 746 P.2d 276 (Utah ment of Emp. Sec, 746 P.2d 276 (Utah Ct. App. 
Ct. App. 1987). 1987). 
35-4-5. Ineligibility for benefits. 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a 
waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employ-
ment and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the 
claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not be denied eligibil-
ity for benefits if the claimant leaves work under circumstances of such a 
nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a 
disqualification. 
The commission shall, in cooperation with the employer, consider for 
the purposes of this chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attach-
ment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who 
has left work voluntarily to accompany, follow, or join his or her spouse to 
or in a new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsec-
tion. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and ad-
verse to the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commis-
sion, and thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal 
to at least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona 
fide covered employment. 
(2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty consti-
tuting a crime in connection with his work as shown by the facts 
together with his admission, or as shown by his conviction in a court 
of competent jurisdiction of a crime in connection with that dishon-
esty and for the 51 next following weeks. If by reason of his alleged 
dishonesty in connection with his work, the individual is held in legal 
custody or is free on bail, any determination of his eligibility shall be 
held in abeyance pending his release or conviction. 
(c) If the commission finds that the claimant has failed without good 
cause to properly apply for available suitable work, to accept a referral to 
suitable work offered by the employment office, or to accept suitable work 
offered by an employer or the employment office. The ineligibility con-
tinues until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered 
employment and earned wages for the services in an amount equal to at 
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least six times the claimant's weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall 
not be denied eligibility for benefits for failure to apply, accept referral, or 
accept available suitable work under circumstances of such a nature that 
it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to impose a disqualifi-
cation. 
The commission shall consider the purposes of this chapter, the reason-
ableness of the claimant's actions, and the extent to which the actions 
evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the labor market in reach-
ing a determination of whether the ineligibility of a claimant is contrary 
to equity and good conscience. 
(1) In determining whether or not work is suitable for an individ-
ual, the commission shall consider the degree of risk involved to his 
health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his 
prior earnings and experience, his length of unemployment and pros-
pects for securing local work in his customary occupation, the wages 
for similar work in the locality, and the distance of the available 
work from his residence. 
Prior earnings shall be considered on the basis of all four quarters 
used in establishing eligibility and not just the earnings from the 
most recent employer. The commission shall be more prone to find 
work as suitable the longer the claimant has been unemployed and 
the less likely the prospects are to secure local work in his customary 
occupation. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no work is 
suitable, and benefits shall not be denied under this chapter to any 
otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under 
any of the following conditions: 
(i) if the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, 
lockout, or other labor dispute; 
(ii) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered 
are substantially less favorable to the individual than those pre-
vailing for similar work in the locality; 
(iii) if as a condition of being employed the individual would 
be required to join a company union or to resign from or refrain 
from joining any bona fide labor organization, 
(d) For any week in which the commission finds that his unemploy-
ment is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike involv-
ing his grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or establishment at 
which he is or was last employed. 
(1) If the commission finds that a strike has been fomented by a 
worker of any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or 
group of workers of the individual who is found to be a party to the 
plan, or agreement to foment a strike, shall be eligible for benefits. 
However, if the commission finds that the strike is caused by the 
failure or refusal of any employer to conform to the provisions of any 
law of the state of Utah or of the United States pertaining to hours, 
wages, or other conditions of work, the strike shall not render the 
workers ineligible for benefits. 
(2) If the commission finds that the employer, his agent or repre-
sentative has conspired, planned, or agreed with any of his workers, 
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their agents or representatives to foment a strike, that strike shall 
not render the workers ineligible for benefits. 
(3) A worker may receive benefits if, subsequent to his unemploy-
ment because of a strike as defined in Subsection (d), he has obtained 
employment and has been paid wages of not less than the amount 
specified in Subsection 35-4-3(d) and has worked as specified in Sub-
section 35-4-4(f). During the existence of the stoppage of work due to 
this strike the wages of the worker used for the determination of his 
benefit rights shall not include any wages he earned from the em-
ployer involved in the strike. 
(e) For each week with respect to which the claimant willfully made a 
false statement or representation or knowingly failed to report a material 
fact to obtain any benefit under the provisions of this act, and an addi-
tional 13 weeks for the first week the statement or representation was 
made or fact withheld and six weeks for each week thereafter; the addi-
tional weeks not to exceed 49 weeks. The additional period shall com-
mence on the Sunday following the issuance of a determination finding 
the claimant in violation of this subsection. Each individual found in 
violation of this subsection shall repay to the commission the amount of 
benefits the claimant actually received and, as a civil penalty, an amount 
equal to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of his fraud. 
The penalty amount shall be regarded as any other penalty under this 
chapter. These amounts shall be collectible by civil action or warrant in 
the manner provided in Subsections 35-4-17(c) and (e). A claimant is 
ineligible for future benefits or waiting week credit if any amount owed 
under this subsection remains unpaid. 
Determinations under this subsection shall be made only upon a sworn 
written admission of the claimant or after due notice and recorded hear-
ing. If a claimant waives the recorded hearing, a determination shall be 
made based upon all the facts which the commission, exercising due dili-
gence, has obtained. Determinations by the commission are appealable in 
the manner provided by this act for appeals from other benefit determina-
tions. 
(f) For any week with respect to which or a part of which he has re-
ceived or is seeking unemployment benefits under an unemployment 
compensation law of another state or the United States. If the appropriate 
agency of the other state or of the United States finally determines that 
he is not entitled to those unemployment benefits, this disqualification 
does not apply. 
(g) (1) For any week in which he is registered at and attending an 
established school, or is on vacation during or between successive 
quarters or semesters of school attendance, unless the major portion 
of his wages for insured work during his base period was for services 
performed while attending school. Notwithstanding the foregoing 
provisions of this subsection, an otherwise eligible individual is not 
ineligible to receive benefits while attending a part-time training 
course. An otherwise eligible individual shall not be denied benefits 
for any week because he is in training with the approval of the com-
mission, and that individual is not ineligible to receive benefits by 
reason of nonavailability for work, failure to search for work, refusal 
of suitable work, or failure to apply for or to accept suitable work 
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with respect to any week he is in training with the approval of the 
commission. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, no other-
wise eligible individual shall be denied benefits for any week because 
he is in training approved under Section 236(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 
1974, nor shall he be denied benefits for leaving work to enter that 
training, provided the work left is not suitable employment, or be-
cause of the application to any such week in training of provisions in 
this law or any applicable federal unemployment compensation law 
relating to availability for work, active search for work, or refusal to 
accept work. 
For purposes of this subsection, "suitable employment" means work of a 
substantially equal or higher skill level than the individual's past 
adversely affected employment, as defined for purposes of the Trade Act 
of 1974, and wages for that work at not less than 80% of the individual's 
average weekly wage as determined for the purposes of the Trade Act of 
1974. 
(h) For any week with respect to which he is receiving, has received, or 
is entitled to receive remuneration in the form of: 
(1) wages in lieu of notice, or a dismissal or separation payment; or 
(2) accrued vacation or terminal leave payment. 
If the remuneration is less than the benefits which would otherwise be 
due, he is entitled to receive for that week, if otherwise eligible, benefits 
reduced as provided in Subsection 35-4-3(c). 
(i) (1) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on 
service for an educational institution in an instructional, research, or 
principal administrative capacity and which begins during the period 
between two successive academic years, or during a similar period 
between two regular terms, whether or not successive, or during a 
period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's con-
tract if the individual performs services in the first of those academic 
years or terms and if there is a contract or reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform services in any such capacity for an edu-
cational institution in the second of the academic years or terms. 
(2) For any week in which the individual's benefits are based on 
service in any other capacity for an educational institution, and 
which week begins during a period between two successive academic 
years or terms if the individual performs those services in the first of 
the academic years or terms and there is a reasonable assurance that 
the individual will perform the services in the second of the academic 
years or terms. If compensation is denied to any individual under this 
subparagraph and the individual was not offered an opportunity to 
perform such services for the educational institution for the second of 
such academic years or terms, the individual shall be entitled to a 
retroactive payment of compensation for each week for which the 
individual filed a timely claim for compensation and for which com-
pensation was denied solely by reason of this subparagraph. 
(3) With respect to any services described in Subsections (i)(l) or 
(2), compensation payable on the basis of those services shall be de-
nied to an individual for any week which commences during an es-
tablished and customary vacation period or holiday recess if the indi-
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vidual performs the services in the period immediately before the 
vacation period or holiday recess, and there is a reasonable assurance 
that the individual will perform the services in the period immedi-
ately following the vacation period or holiday recess. 
(4) With respect to services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2), 
compensation payable on the basis of those services as provided in 
Subsection (i)(l), (2), or (3) shall be denied to an individual who 
performed those services in an educational institution while in the 
employ of an educational service agency. For purposes of this Subsec-
tion (i)(4), "educational service agency" means a governmental 
agency or entity established and operated exclusively for the purpose 
of providing the services described in Subsection (i)(l) or (2) to an 
educational institution. 
Benefits based on service in employment defined in Subsections 
35-4-22(j)(2)(D) and (E) are payable in the same amount, on the same 
terms and subject to the same conditions as compensation payable on the 
basis of other service subject to this chapter. 
(j) For any week which commences during the period between two suc-
cessive sport seasons or similar periods if the individual performed any 
services, substantially all of which consists of participating in sports or 
athletic events or training or preparing to participate in the first of those 
seasons or similar periods and there is a reasonable assurance that indi-
vidual will perform those services in the later of the seasons or similar 
periods. 
(k) (1) For any week in which the benefits are based upon services 
performed by an alien, unless the alien is an individual who has been 
lawfully admitted for permanent residence at the time the services 
were performed, was lawfully present for purposes of performing the 
services or, was permanently residing in the United States under 
color of law at the time the services were performed, including an 
alien who is lawfully present in the United States as a result of the 
application of Subsection 203(a)(7) or Subsection 212(d)(5) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act. 
(2) Any data or information required of individuals applying for 
benefits to determine whether benefits are not payable to them be-
cause of their alien status shall be uniformly required from all appli-
cants for benefits. 
(3) In the case of an individual whose application for benefits 
would otherwise be approved, no determination that benefits to the 
individual are not payable because of his alien status shall be made 
except upon a preponderance of the evidence. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 40, § 5; C. 1943, 
42-2a-5; L. 1949, ch. 53, § 1; 1951, ch. 50, § 1; 
1955, ch. 60, § 1; 1959, ch. 57, § 1; 1963, ch. 
52, § 1; 1971, ch. 78, § 4; 1971, ch. 79, § 1; 
1976, ch. 19, § 2; 1977 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 3; 
1979, ch. 137, § 3; 1982, ch. 78, § 4; 1983 (1st 
S.S.), ch. 20, § 3; 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 18, § 1; 
1985, ch. 232, § 2; 1987, ch. 81, § 3; 1987, ch. 
92, § 49. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
amendment, effective April 6, 1984, substi-
tuted numbers for letters and vice versa as 
subsection designations; inserted "Subsection 
(9)(a) or (b)" in each sentence of subsection 
(9)(b); substituted "Subsections (9)(a) or (b)" for 
"clause (1) or (2)" in subsection (9)(c); inserted 
subsection (9)(d); and made minor changes in 
phraseology, punctuation and style. 
The 1985 amendment redesignated the for-
merly numbered subsections as lettered sub-
sections, and vice versa; deleted bracketed sub-
headings preceding each of Subsections (a) 
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KEVIN R. JOHNSON 
S.S.A. No. 523-17-5731 : 
: Case No. 33-A-0353 
DECISION 
: Case No. 88-33-086 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SZC'^lTf : 
The employer, Morton Thickcl, appeals the decision of the Admini-
strat ive Lav; Jucge in tne above-entitled natter ,ihich held that the claimant, 
Kevin R. Jonnson, had been discharged frora his employment with tne emoloyer 
for reasons that are -not disqualifying under §35—i—5(b) (1) of tne Utah 
Employment Security Act. The ALJus decision therefore allowed payment of 
unemployment benefits to the claimant effective December 20, 1937 and 
continuing, provided he is otherwise eligible. Tne ALJ's decision also 
held tne employer liable for benefit charges pursuant to §35-4-7(c) of tne 
Act. 
After careful consideration of the record in this matter, the 
Board of Review reverses the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and 
denies payment of benefits on the grounds the claimant was dischargee from 
his employment for reasons that are disqualifying under §35-4-5(b)(l) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. 
In reversing the decision of the ALJ, the Board of Review notes 
that , as in i ts prior decision in I3S-3R-31, involving the same employer, 
the employer's rule was reasonable and* its application to the claimant was 
fair . After being involved in an accident the claimant was drug tested 
in accordance with company policy. The test results were positive. The 
company reviewed the situation and concluded that Mr. Johnson was not at 
fault in the accident and therefore did not terminate him even though the 
drug tes t results were positive. Rather, the employer referred the claimant 
to the employee assistance program for counselling. He was advised he was 
subject to random testing during the next 12 month period. On November 25, 
1987, 65 days after the initial positive test result, the claimant was 
selected for an additional drug testing. He again tested positive for 
marijuana use. 
The Board of Review finds the claimant's testimony that he did 
not use marijuana again after the first test to not be credible. Although, 
by his own admission the claimant continued to live in an environment where 
marijuana was illegally consumed on a daily basis by his roommates, the 
Board of Review does not agree that passive inhalation alone was sufficient 
to account for the positive results on the second test* 
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Employers have a responsibility to ensure a safe workplace for 
their employees ana also to produce produces thaw are, insofar as possible, 
frz^ of hiaden defects. This emoloyer's drug policy ana tne manner in 
whicn i t was aopliea promote those lauaible oojeccives. This Boara will 
not undermine tnose objectives by allowing unemployment benefits to those 
who have been discnargec for violating an employer's reasonable policy or 
rule respecting tne use of illegal crugs. The emoloyer is tnere~cra 
relieved of benefit cnarges as providea by §35---7(c)(3)(F) of tne Utan 
Employment Security Act. 
This decision creates an overpayment in the amount of $3,513.00. 
- -- -*,,!*• in tne creation of this overpayment. There-:*ion <-.=-'—• —• - . nf ^h-jc overoaymc.nt. ma.--
f o r e , t n e c i a i ^ f u w r e benenu, payaote 
to have u deauc — 
current benent year. efit r. 
This decision will become final ten days after the date of mail-
ing hereof, and any further appeal must be made directly with tne Court of 
Appeals, Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Suite ^00, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, within ten days after this decision becomes final. To fi le an aopeal 
with the Court of Aooeals, you must submit to the Clerk of tne Court a 
Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for aopeal, pursuant 
to §35-^-10(i) of the Utah Employment Security Act, followed by a Docketing 
Statement and a Legal Brief. 
Dated t h i s 10th day of May, 1983. 
0 a t e Hailed: May 12, 1988. 
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I hereby certify tnat I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing DECISION to be served upon eacn of the following on zhis /££& 
day of May, 1933 oy mailing tne sa.~e, postage precaic, Uni-ac Scales 
mail to: 
R. i 
For: Morton Thiokol 
Attn: Debbie St. Clair 
P. 0. Box 1150 
Columbus, OH 43215 
Kevin R. Johnson 
3755 Grant Avenue 
Ogaen, UT 34^01 
dSLLCL^ *$* /?&7.< 
Cherie 0. Moraan 
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KEVIN R. JOHNSON 
S.S.A. No- 523-17-5731 : 
: Case No. 88-A-03S3 
DECISION 
: Case No. 38-3R-085 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Subsequent to its decision dated May 10, 1988 and mailed May 12, 
1988, the Board of Review received a letter from the claimant's attorney, Oavid 
Bert Havas, wherein Mr. Havas requested the Board of Review to reconsider its 
decision on the grounds that he was never notified of the employer's appeal and 
was not given an opportunity to submit written argument in favor of the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which decision allowed benefits to 
the claimant and was reversed by the 8oard of Review. Mr. Havas requested an 
opportunity to submit written argument for the Board's reconsideration. 
This request by Mr. Havas was granted by the Board of Review which 
has now received Mr. Havas' memorandum in support of affirmance of the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding benefits to the claimant. 
After carefully considering the evidence of record in this matter, 
the appeal of the employer, and the written arguments of claimant's counsel, 
the Board of Review remands this matter to the ALJ to take new evidence as 
hereinafter set forth, pursuant to the provisions of Section 
35-4-10(d)(2)(C)(2)(a) of the rules of the Department which provide in 
pertinent part: 
The Board may also remand a matter for the taking of new 
evidence if, in the discretion of the Board, such 
evidence is of particularly significant importance that 
the Board determines its inclusion in the record is 
necessary for proper administration of the Act. 
In reviewing the testimony and other evidence of record in this 
case, the Board of Review is satisfied that the employer has followed the 
requirements of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Statute while testing the 
claimant for controlled substances (illegal drugs). The claimant has tested 
positive for the presence of controlled substances in his system on both 
GG0047 
KEVIN R. JOHNSON -2- Case No. 88-A-0353 
S.S.A. No. 523-17-5731 Case No. 88-3R-035 
September 21st and November 25th of 1987. The claimant has admitted the use of 
marijuana prior to the first test on September 21, 1987 but has denied under 
oath that he used any marijuana between the test in September and the test in 
November. He testified the test results were 1.23 on the September test and 
.25 on the November test. He cites the difference in his test results as 
supportive of his claim that he did not use marijuana between the two tests. 
He attributes the positive result on the November test to either being a 
residual of his usage of marijuana prior to the September test or to passive 
inhalation as a result of the daily marijuana smoking of his two roommates in 
his presence. 
Neither the employer nor the claimant presented expert testimony 
regarding the drug test results, or the significance of the apparent decrease 
from 1.23 to .25 in the test results as indicated by the claimant. Without 
expert testimony as to the meaning of the test results, the Board of Review is 
unable to determine whether the 65 days between the September test and the 
November test was sufficient time for the tested drug to clear the claimant's 
body, and if so, the possibilities of the claimant testing positive as a result 
of passive inhalation while in the same room with others who are smoking 
marijuana. 
The Board of Review therefore requests the ALJ to reopen the hearing 
and call as an expert witness Ellwood Loveridge, PhD, Director of Scientific 
Support Services for the Salt Lake County Health Department. Dr. Loveridge 
can be reached at phone number 534-4554. The. notice of the reopened hearing 
should be sent to Dr. Loveridge as well as to the claimant and the employer. 
Dr. Loveridge should be given the option of testifying in this matter by 
telephone. The claimant and the employer shall each be given the opportunity 
to cross-examine Dr. Loveridge as to his interpretation of the drug test 
results and to offer additional expert testimony in rebuttal if they care to do 
so. The employer is also requested to have the lab people who ran the tests in 
behalf of the employer available to testify as to their procedures and the test 
results of both the September and the November tests of the claimant so that 
Dr. Loveridge will be able to provide his interpretation of those test results 
for the record. At the close of the reopened hearing, the ALJ is requested to 
have the testimony transcribed and forwarded to the Board of Review for a final 
decision. 
A BOARS OF REV/EW JU2L.' 
Dated this 27th day of September, 1988. / ^ f i ^ « K J i ) J £ ^-*^ 
Date Mailed: October 14, 1988. y/^ \*r^^^>^^_ 
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I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing DECISION to be served upon each of the 
following on this /^5? day of October, 1983 by mailing the 
same, postage prepaid, United States mail to: 
R.E- Harrington 
For: Morton Thiokol 
Attn: Debbie St. Clair 
P. 0. Box 1160 
Columbus, OH 43215 
Kevin R. Johnson 
3755 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
a. 
Cherie D. Morgan 
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S.2.A. No. 528-17-5731 : 
: Case No. 88-A-03S3 
: DECISION 
Case No. 88-3R-4-23 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY : 
Subsequent to its decision dated May 10, 1988 and mailed May 12, 
1983, the 8oard of Review received a letter from the claimant's attorney, Oavid 
8ert Havas, wherein Mr. Havas requested the Board of Review to reconsider its 
decision on the grounds that he was never notified of the employer's appeal and 
was not given an opportunity to submit written argument in favor of the 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge, which decision allowed benefits to 
the claimant and was reversed by the Board of Review. Mr. Havas requested an 
opportunity to submit written argument for the Board's reconsideration. 
This request by Mr. Havas was granted by the Board of Review. 
After receiving Mr. Havas' memorandum in support of affirmance of the 
Administrative Law Judge's decision awarding benefits to the claimant, the 
8oard of Review remanded this case to the ALJ to take additional evidence. In 
the remand decision dated September 27, 1988 and mailed October 14, 1988, the 
Board of Review requested that the additional testimony be transcribed and 
forwarded to the Board of Review for a final decision. The Board of Review has 
now received the additional evidence. 
After carefully considering the evidence of record in this matter, 
the appeal of the employer, and the written arguments of claimant's counsel, 
the Board of Review respectfully declines to reverse its decision dated May 10, 
1988 and mailed May 12, 1988. 
In declining to reverse its May 10, 1988 decision, the 8oard of 
Review makes the following additional comments and findings of fact based 
on the October 25, 1988 reopened hearing before the ALJ. 
The Board of Review notes that the claimant's attorney objected to 
Dr. Loveridge being accepted as an expert witness in this case on the grounds 
that Dr. Loveridge was not qualified as an analytical chemist dealing with the 
testing of marijuana in the human body and how long marijuana residue remains 
in the human body. After carefully considering Dr. Loveridge's answers to Mr. 
Havas' questions regarding his experience and expertise with respect to 
marijuana testing, the Board of Review sustains Mr. Havas' objections and 
therefore disregards Dr. Loveridge's testimony in this matter. 
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The employer called Dr. Kerr of i ts medical services unit as a 
witness in this matter. While Dr. Kerr acknowledged that he is not a 
specialist in the field of human toxicology, he testified that he did have 
knowledge about the length of time that marijuana residue or cannabinoids 
remains in the human body. 
Dr. Kerr test if ied that the claimant's f i r s t test on September 21st 
reported positive for 128 nanograms per mi l l i l i te r for cannabinoids. The 
second tesz on November 25th again tasted positive for cannabinoids at 25 
nanograms per mi l l i l i t e r . The required confirmation tests were run on the 
samples provided by the claimant on each of those dates. Dr. Kerr testified 
the threshold or cutoff point on the preliminary screen test is 20 nanograms 
per mi l l i l i t e r and 6 nonograms per mill i l i ter on the confirmation or gas 
chromatography tes t . Therefore, the 25 nanograms per mi l l i l i t e r measured on 
the claimant's November 25th test breached the threshold for a positive test. 
Dr. Kerr acknowledged that the 25 nanograms per mi l l i l i te r result of the 
claimant's November 25th test was significantly lower than the 128 nanograms 
per mi l l i l i t e r from the claimant's September 21st t e s t . He acknowledged that 
he could not predict how long before the 25 nanogram level was found that the 
last exposure to marijuana occurred. He acknowledged that there is a prolonged 
time in which a test for cannabinoids will remain positive. He did not 
believe, however, that the test would remain positive on November 25th, 1987, 
if the claimant had not encountered further exposure to marijuana since 
September 21, 1987. Dr. Kerr also acknowledged that there is some evidence to 
indicate that extreme exposure to passive inhalation can cause a positive test 
result, such as three or four hours in a closed car or a small room with three 
to six people heavily smoking marijuana. He knew of no scientific studies that 
would indicate whether prolonged exposure such as experienced by the claimant 
living with other individuals who frequently used marijuana could result in a 
positive tes t . Dr. Kerr testified that marijuana can be detected in the body 
for several weeks after i t s use, but noted that by several weeks he meant four 
to six weeks. He stated he was not personally aware of any studies where 
positive tests resulted after a longer period of time. 
Dr. Kerr testified that follow-up tests of employees who have 
tested positive on a f i r s t test are not administered until at least six weeks 
have passed. He stated the six week period was arrived at on the 
recommendation of the Center for Human Toxicology at the University of Utah. 
The Center for Human Toxicology felt that anyone who wasn't continuing exposure 
to marijuana would test negative after six weeks. 
Based on the testimony of Dr. Kerr, the Board of Review finds the 
testimony of the claimant wherein he denied continued use of marijuana after 
the September 21, 1987 test to not be credible. The Board of Review finds that 
if the* claimant had discontinued the use of marijuana after the September 21, 
1987 t es t , he would have tested negative when tested again 65 days later on 
November 25, 1987. 
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In 1937, the Utah State Legislature passed a drug and alcohol 
testing s tatute with the following declared purpose and intent as found in 
Section 34-33-1 of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act: 
34-38-1. Legislative findings - Purpose and intent of 
chapter. 
The Legislature finds that a healthy and 
productive work force, safe working conditions free from the 
effects of drugs and alcohol, and maintenance of the quality 
of products produced and services rendered in this s tate , 
are important to employers, employees, and the general 
public. The Legislature further finds that the abuse of 
drugs and alcohol creates a variety of workplace problems, 
including increased injuries on the job, increased 
absenteeism, increased financial burden on health and 
benefit programs, increased workplace theft, decreased 
employee morale, decreased productivity, and a decline in 
the quality of products and services. 
Therefore, in balancing the interests of 
employers, employees, and the welfare of the general public, 
the Legislature finds that fair and equitable testing for 
drugs and alcohol in the workplace, in accordance with this 
chapter, is in the best interest of all parties. 
The Legislature does not intend to prohibit any 
employee from seeking damages or job reinstatement, if 
action was taken by his employer based on a false drug or 
alcohol test result . 
The Board of Review finds the employer's alcohol and drug policy to 
be consistent with and.in compliance with the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing 
Act. On the other hand, by his own admissions in this record, the claimant 
appears to have violated Section 58-37-3(2)(a)(iii) of the Utah Controlled 
Substances Act, which provides: 
58-37-3. Prohibited acts - Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
( i i i ) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to be present where controlled substances are being 
used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the 
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may 
not be convicted under this subsection if the evidence 
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snows that he did not use the substance himself or 
aovise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any 
incidence of prior unlawful use of control lea sub-
stances oy tne defendant may be admitted to rebut tnis 
defense; • . . 
Although the claimant contends he did use marijuana after the 
first test on September 21, 1937, the positive results of the second test 
on iiovemoer 25, 1937, together with his admission that he continued to live 
with two roommates wno consumed marijuana in his presence eK/ery day and 
that he was thus exposed to marijuana smoke three or four times a night, 
leacs the 3oara of Review to a conclusion that the claimant's denial of 
marijuana use following the September test is not credible. The claimant 
has admitted using marijuana prior to tne September test. The Board of 
Review is not convinced that the claimant discontinued his personal use 
of marijuana after tne September test where he continued to live in an 
environment where marijuana was used three or four times a nignt on a daily 
basis by the claimant's roommates. The Novemoer test results indicate 
otherwise. There is nothing in the record of this case to convince the 
3oard of Review that passive inhalation, under the circumstances described 
by tne claimant, which appears to violate the Utah Controlled Substances 
Act, as notea above, is any less culpaole or harmful in its effect than 
direct innalation of marijuana smoke. 
The Board of Review therefore declines to undermine the 1 audible 
objectives of the Utah Drug and Alcohol Testing Act, the Utah Controlled 
Suostances Act, and this employer's drug and alcohol policies by allowing 
unemployment insurance benefits to one wno has lost his employment through 
a willful violation of his employer's drug and alcohol policy. 
This decision becomes final on the date it is mailed, and any 
further appeal must be made within 3Q days from the date of mailing. Your 
appeal must be submitted in writing to the Utah Court of Appeals, Midtown 
- — cnn c i S t j suite ~ ^  f-'-- r*+" Utah. To file an 
appeal ~,w.. -. _ r Appeals, you must submit ZQ uie v-»^ ... ~. ... . 
a Petition for Writ of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant 
- --. ^~ ^
 thPL utail Administrative Procedures Act and Rule 14 of the 
'-"-••*'*
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Dated this 30th day of Decemoer, 1988. 
Date Mailed: December 8, 1988. 
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